

AGENDA

***2019 Third Annual International Conference
Globalizing U.S.-Taiwan Partnership :
The Cooperation beyond Taiwan strait?***

8 December 2019, Taipei, Taiwan

Institute of Diplomacy and International Affairs
No. 280, Section 1, Dun-Hua South Rd, Da'an District, Taipei City, 106

**第三屆台美智庫國際論壇
邁向全球化的台美關係：超越台灣海峽的合作夥伴？**

2019 年 12 月 8 日

外交部「外交及國際事務學院」
台灣智庫、全球台灣研究中心主辦
外交部協辦



* Please scan QR code to visit Slido.com and enter the event code: #T2019 to submit or upvote the questions during the conference.

會議進行期間，歡迎掃描 QR code 到網站 Slido.com 輸入代碼：#T2019 提出或票選問題。

* 本次會議全程以英文進行，不備翻譯，尚祈見諒

議程 Agenda	
09:00~09:30	報到 Registration
09:30~09:40	<p>開幕致詞：吳榮義（台灣智庫董事長、全球台灣研究中心榮譽董事長） Opening : Dr. Rong-Yi WU Chairperson, Taiwan Thinktank Honorary Chairperson, Global Taiwan Institute</p>
09:40~10:00	<p>專題演講：林佳龍（交通部長、前台灣智庫董事長） Keynote speech : Dr. Chia-Lung LIN Minister, Ministry of Transportation and Communications Former Chairperson, Taiwan Thinktank</p>
10:00~10:20	茶點休息時間 Tea break
10:20~12:00	<p>邁向全球化的台美關係：超越台灣海峽的合作夥伴？ Globalizing U.S.-Taiwan Partnership : The Cooperation beyond Taiwan strait?</p> <p>主持人：賴怡忠 台灣智庫國際合作委員會主席 Moderator : Dr. I-Chung LAI Chairperson, Council for International Cooperation, Taiwan Thinktank</p> <p>與談人 Panelists :</p> <p>楊甦棣 前美國在台協會處長 Amb. Stephen YOUNG Former Director, American Institute in Taiwan, Ambassador (ret.)</p> <p>葛里森 前美國防部助理部長 Lt. Gen.(ret) Wallace GREGSON Former Assistant Secretary, U. S. Defense (ret.)</p> <p>石明凱 2049計畫研究所執行長 Mr. Mark STOKES Executive Director, Project 2049 Institute</p> <p>林正義 財團法人國防安全研究院執行長 Dr. Cheng-Yi LIN Chief Executive Officer, The Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR)</p> <p>簡淑賢 前美國國會研究處研究員 Ms. Shirley KAN Former Specialist in Asian Security Affairs, Congressional Research Service</p> <p>蕭良其 全球台灣研究中心執行長 Russell HSIAO J.D. Executive Director, Global Taiwan Institute</p>
12:00~	會議結束 End of Conference



Dr. Chia-Lung Lin

Minister, Ministry of Transportation
and Communications
Former Chairperson, Taiwan Thinktank

林佳龍 博士

交通部長、前台灣智庫董事長

Dr. Chia-Lung Lin is the Minister of Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the Former Chairperson of Taiwan Thinktank (TTT). Before becoming Minister of MOTC, , Dr. Lin was Mayor of Taichung City, a Legislator from February 2012 to November 2014. From 2007 to 2009 he was the Deputy Secretary-General at the Presidential Office, and the year prior to that, he was the DPP Secretary General. Dr. Lin also held many other important jobs, such as President of Taiwan Greater Taichung Development Association (2006-2014), Member of the National Assembly (2005), and Minister of the Government Information Office in the Executive Yuan (2004-2005). Furthermore, Dr. Lin was also a Cabinet Spokesperson, and an Advisor to the National Security Council. Dr. Lin held academic titles of Assistant Professor of National Chung Cheng University, and Visiting Associate Research Fellow at the United Nations University.

Dr. Lin holds a B.A. and M.A. from the Department of Political Science at the National Taiwan University. He also holds an additional M.A. in philosophy and political science, and a Ph.D. in political science from Yale University.



Dr. Rong-I Wu

Chairperson, Taiwan Thinktank
Honorary Chairperson, Global Taiwan Institute

吳榮義 董事長

台灣智庫董事長、
全球台灣研究中心榮譽董事長

Dr. Rong-I Wu is the chairperson of Taiwan Thinktank and honorary chairperson of Global Taiwan Institute. In addition to these titles, he is the Chairperson of Taiwan Capital Management Corporation and Senior Advisor to the President of Taiwan, and the Chairperson of Taiwan Water Resources and Agricultural Research Institute, and Senior Adviser of the Taiwan Institute of Economic Research.

Dr. Wu served as Chairperson of Taiwan Brain Trust, Vice Premier of the Executive Yuan, Chairperson of Taiwan Stock Exchange, and Chairperson of Taiwan Futures Exchange. He was Advisor to the Taiwan delegation to the APEC Ministerial and Leaders' Meetings. He was also the Professor and Chairperson of the Department of Economics, National Chung-Hsing University and the President of Taiwan Institute of Economic Research.

Dr. Wu received BA and MA in Economics, National Taiwan University in 1962 and 1965, and Ph.D. in Economics in 1971 from the Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium.



Dr. I-Chung Lai

Chairperson, Council for International
Cooperation, Taiwan Thinktank

賴怡忠 博士

台灣智庫國際合作委員會主席

Dr. I-Chung Lai is the Chairperson of the Council for International Cooperation at Taiwan Thinktank (TTT), the President of the Prospect Foundation. In addition to these titles, he is also an Assistant Professor at Mackay College for Medicine and Management. Prior to his current positions, Dr. Lai was the Vice President of Taiwan Thinktank from 2013 to 2016. Dr. Lai served as Director General for the Department of International Affairs (2007-2008) and Director General for the Department of China Affairs (2006-2008) in the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). From 2003 to 2006 he was the Director of the Foreign Policy Studies at the Taiwan Thinktank. Prior to this position, Dr. Lai was the Special Assistant for Policy to Taiwan's Representative to Japan (2000-2003), and the Executive Director for DPP Mission in the United States (1999-2000).

Dr. Lai received his Ph.D. degree from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech), and was a Visiting Researcher at Cornell University.



Amb. Stephen M. Young

| Former Director, American Institute in Taiwan,
Ambassador (ret.)

楊甦棣 博士

| 前美國在台協會台北辦事處處長

Ambassador Stephen Young (ret.) served as a U.S. diplomat for over 33 years, with assignments in Washington, Taipei, Moscow, Beijing, Bishkek, and Hong Kong. Amb. Young was Ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic, Director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), and Consul General in Hong Kong. Young first lived in Taiwan as a teen in the 1960's, when his father was a military assistance advisory group (MAAG) advisor to the Taiwan military. He lived a total of 11 years in Taiwan. Since retiring to his family home in New Hampshire in 2013, Young has been writing and speaking at seminars. He was a Visiting Professor at Wesleyan University last year, where he taught a seminar on Modern Chinese Foreign Policy.

He earned a B.A. at Wesleyan University and a Ph.D. in history at the University of Chicago.



Lt. Gen.(ret) Wallace GREGSON

Former Assistant Secretary,
U. S. Defense (ret.)

葛里森

前美國防部助理部長

Lieutenant General Wallace “Chip” Gregson (USMC, Ret.) served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. Previously, he served as Chief Operating Officer for the United States Olympic Committee, then as an independent consultant before entering Government in 2009.

From 2003 to 2005, he was Commanding General of the Marine Corps Forces Pacific and Marine Corps Forces Central Command, where he led and managed over 70,000 Marines and Sailors in the Middle East, Afghanistan, East Africa, Asia and the United States. From 2001 to 2003 he served as Commanding General of the III Marine Expeditionary Force in Japan, where he was awarded the Japanese Order of the Rising Sun, the Gold and Silver Star; the Korean Order of National Security Merit, Gukseon Medal; and the Order of Resplendent Banner from the Republic of China. Prior to his time in Japan he was Director of Asia-Pacific Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1998 to 2000.

Lt. Gen. Gregson is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations; the U.S. Naval Institute; and the Marine Corps Association. He is a Trustee of the Marine Corps University Foundation. His civilian education includes a Bachelor’s degree from the U.S. Naval Academy, and Master’s degrees in Strategic Planning from the Naval War College, and International Relations from Salve Regina College.



Mr. Mark Stokes

| Executive Director,
Project 2049 Institute

石明凱 先生

| 美國智庫「2049計畫研究所」執行長

Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Mark Stokes is the Executive Director of the Project 2049 Institute. In addition to Taiwan issues, Mark's research focus includes Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force and Strategic Support Force, defense industry, military and political leadership, and cross-strait relations. Mark has served in a variety of military and private sector positions. A 20-year U.S. Air Force veteran, he served in intelligence, planning, and policy positions. From 1984-1989, he was assigned to the Philippines and West Berlin. After graduate school and Chinese language training, Mark served as Assistant Air Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing from 1992 to 1995. From 1995 to May 1997, he was assigned as a Strategic Planner within the U.S. Air Force Plans and Operations Directorate. Between 1997 and 2004, he served as Senior Country Director for China and Taiwan in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. After retiring from military service, he worked in the private sector on Taiwan for more than three years. Mark joined Project 2049 in 2008.

He holds a B.A. from Texas A&M University and graduate degrees in international relations and Asian studies from Boston University and the Naval Postgraduate School. He has working proficiency in Mandarin Chinese.



Dr. Cheng-Yi Lin

Chief Executive Officer, The Institute for
National Defense and Security Research
(INDSR)

林正義 博士

財團法人國防安全研究院執行長

Dr. Cheng-Yi Lin is a well-known scholar on Taiwan-China affairs and was Taiwan's Deputy Minister of the Mainland Affairs Council, R.O.C., from May 2016 to April 2018. Between 1988-2003, Mr Lin was a research fellow, deputy director and director at Academia Sinica, a prominent research institution in Taiwan, before becoming director of the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University between 2004-2005.



Ms. Shirley Kan

Former Specialist in Asian Security Affairs,
Congressional Research Service

簡淑賢 女士

美國國會研究服務處 (CRS)
亞洲安全事務退休專家

Ms. Shirley Kan is an Independent Advisor and Specialist, and a retired Specialist in Asian Security Affairs of the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service (CRS), a non-partisan agency of the U.S. Congress.

At CRS from 1990 to 2015, Shirley Kan wrote policy analyses and provided other legislative support to Congress as a Specialist in Asian Security Affairs. Her commendations include the CRS' Special Achievement Award for 25 years of dedicated service and commitment to Congress.

Ms. Kan has been a member of the Advisory Board of the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI), a think tank in Washington, D.C., since its founding in September 2016. She participates in conferences and is cited in the media as an independent specialist.

She also writes analyses that have appeared in publications that include: Project 2049 Institute's AsiaEye, GTI's Global Taiwan Brief, National Interest, Pacific Forum's PacNet Newsletter, Taipei Times, The Diplomat, the University of Nottingham's Taiwan Insight, and NBR's online "roundtable." See: <https://shirleykan.net/analyses/>

Shirley Kan has specialized in national security interests in U.S. policies concerning the People's Republic of China (PRC) and concerning Taiwan. Her writings discuss policy concerns that include the challenges of weapons nonproliferation, counter-terrorism, military-to-military contacts, the PLA's modernization and missile buildup, U.S. security assistance for Taiwan's self-defense, the "one China" policy for supporting U.S. interests in the Taiwan Strait, and the defense buildup on Guam.

Ms. Kan attended the Commandant's National Security Program at the Army War College in July 2012. During the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996, she directly supported the Defense Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, for which she received the Defense Department's Special Achievement Award. In China in the summer of 1989, she reported on the pro-democracy movement and political-military crisis (i.e., the "Tiananmen Crackdown") while serving at the U.S. Consulate-General in Shenyang as the Political Intern.

Shirley Kan graduated cum laude from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service (SFS) in Washington, D.C., with a Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service and from the Rackham Graduate School of the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, MI.



Mr. Russell Hsiao

| Executive Director, Global Taiwan Institute

蕭良其 先生

| 全球台灣研究中心執行長

Russell Hsiao is the Executive Director of the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) and current Penn Kemble Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy. He previously served as a Senior Research Fellow at the Project 2049 Institute and National Security Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Prior to those positions he was the Editor of China Brief at The Jamestown Foundation from October 2007 to July 2011, and a Special Associate in the International Cooperation Department at the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy. While in law school, he clerked within the Office of the chairperson at the Federal Communications Commission and the Interagency Trade Enforcement Center at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.

Mr. Hsiao received his J.D. and certificate from the Law and Technology Institute at the Catholic University of America's Columbus School of Law, where he served as the Editor-in-Chief of the Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology. He received a B.A. in International Studies from the American University's School of International Service and the University Honors Program.

Globalizing U.S-Taiwan Partnership Cooperation beyond the Taiwan Strait



By Ambassador Stephen M. Young (ret)

It is no secret that PRC strongman Xi Jinping has been seeking to further marginalize Taiwan on the world stage since he came to power seven years ago, and particularly since DPP standard-bearer Tsai Ing-wen was elected to the Presidency in 2016. Xi had actually seen hope for his effort to speed up the goal of reunification during the Ma Ying-jeou presidency. This culminated in the two leaders' highly publicized "summit" meeting in Singapore in 2016.

But Mr. Xi was clearly unhappy when the democratic voters of Taiwan chose a standard-bearer from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), placing Madame Tsai Ing-wen in the Presidential Office after eight years of KMT rule. This was widely seen as a clear repudiation of the KMT policy of accommodation with the mainland, despite the perceived economic benefits of greater cross-trade trade and tourism that had brought.

During Ma's presidency, Mr. Xi had essentially agreed to a moratorium on poaching Taiwan's "diplomatic allies", that is, the twenty-odd countries around the world that still maintained formal diplomatic relations with Taipei, rather than Beijing. Yet shortly after Ms. Tsai took office, Beijing resumed its poaching of these remaining countries, offering economic and political incentives for them to shift their recognition to China. Given the realities of diplomatic practice, a country cannot enjoy formal ties with the two competing sides of the Taiwan Strait. In fact, China was forcing these small countries, many reliant on trade and assistance from the growing PRC economy, to make a stark choice.

Taiwan has fought back, but its arsenal of economic and political favors pales in comparison to those enjoyed by the PRC. Thus, at latest count, there are only fifteen countries, mostly located in Latin America, Africa and the Pacific, that maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taipei.

Xi's objective is transparent: to reduce Taiwan's international diplomatic profile in an attempt to coerce the island into becoming more accommodating. Bluntly speaking China is interfering in the Taiwan democratic process to favor one party over another. With Presidential and legislative elections scheduled for early January, 2020, the competition has heated up in recent months. More can be expected. Most of the remaining formal diplomatic partners with Taiwan are impoverished countries, some with weak democratic traditions, who are desperate for aid and trade to bolster their economic and political prospects.

Bowing to political reality, the United States shifted its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing forty years ago. But the traditional friendship between the U.S. and Taiwan has remained, and even flourished, despite the absence of formal relations. There are a number of reasons for this. Among them, our traditional friendship with the people of Taiwan, many of whom have studied or emigrated to America. The numbers are astounding, with hundreds of thousands of brilliant Taiwan minds studying in top U.S. universities, taking jobs in America, staying on as U.S. permanent residents or citizens, or bringing their skills home to Taiwan after a sojourn in the U.S.

While seeking to remain within the bounds of formal diplomatic practice, the U.S. has partnered with Taiwan in a variety of ways, despite the awkward reality that we do not recognize the Republic of China as a state. We have encouraged Taiwan to play an active role in international organizations that do not require statehood as a prerequisite to membership. An outstanding example has been the World Trade Organization (WTO). With the 12th largest economy in the world, Taiwan should be a member of this regulatory body.

Yet China has played politics here. During the accommodating Ma Administration, Beijing permitted Taipei to become an observer in the WTO. But to show its unhappiness with Taiwan's democratic process when it had the audacity to elect someone not sanctioned and approved in autocratic China, Beijing used its influence to again deprive Taiwan of its informal representation there.

Unfortunately, there is little the United States can do on its own in international organizations where China and its friends can block consensus and prevent Taiwan from playing a more significant role. But Washington does have some ability to work bilaterally with our friends to temper Beijing's recent assault on Taiwan.

First, we can place pressure on Taiwan's remaining diplomatic partners to hold firm and not sever formal diplomatic relations. While financial incentives could be part of the bargain, the prestige and influence of Washington more generally allows us to quietly – and sometimes not so quietly – signal to these states that we strongly disapprove of their temptation to abandon Taiwan for the blandishments China is offering.

We can stress our concern that a rising China in East Asia, and more generally around the world, is bad for the post-World War Two international order, based on mutual benefit and democratic principles. Our financial assistance can be brought to bear to persuade such wavering countries not to become too dependent on China, diplomatically or financially. Of course the Trump Administration should focus more attention on our own commitment to the traditional international order than it has at times.

Our friends and allies in Asia must play a role in this. Japan is a leading skeptic of current Chinese policies, and has its own economic clout that can be brought to bear, particularly with wavering East Asian island nations in need of moral and financial support. The same holds true for ASEAN, though here China has made some inroads, including with traditional ally the Philippines. It would help if the United States revisited its attitude toward budding regional organizations like TPP, whose founding concept was premised on curbing Chinese influence in the area.

The United States has been a key political, economic and moral force in the region for a long time, and its clout has been particularly evident since the end of the second World War. Former National Security Adviser John Bolton understood this well, and his recent departure from the Trump administration is to be regretted. Much will depend on the attitude of Vice President Pence, Secretary of State Pompeo, and other internationalists in the Trump Administration. The Department of Defense also has a key role to play here, understanding the vital role our alliance structure plays in the region. Congress has many eloquent spokespeople who can also exercise their influence, both within the government and in public opinion.

In short, these are troubled times for our longtime friends and allies in the East Asian region. China's economic rise has made it more difficult for many of them to resist the Middle Kingdom's influence, even when it is directly aimed at diminishing the U.S. role. The same holds true in Europe, where new forces are challenging the post-World War II order and America's role there. Despite its stagnant economic progress and authoritarian policies under Vladimir Putin, Russia too plays a destabilizing role in American efforts to maintain its status and presence there. The European Union, as well as stalwart friends in Western and Central Europe, must find the courage to push back on Moscow's new push to reset the clock. We also need to renew our focus on Africa and Latin America, with the same goal in mind.

The struggle will continue. The United States has huge reserves of good will to draw on. Working directly with Taiwan, our many friends and allies around the world, and key international bodies, we can and must stand up for our values, and stand up for our longtime friends and partners in democratic Taiwan, as it counters the increased threat of economic and political marginalization at the hands of autocratic China.

The United States and Taiwan need a common vision on China



By General Wallace C. Gregson

Taiwan grew and prospered within the open, rules-based, market-oriented international order developed by the United States and our allies in the wake of World War II. This global order and our alliance systems provided a security shield protecting political life and economic growth. Within this security shield, Taiwan became a robust, vibrant, prosperous democracy.

But now the skies are darkening. Years ago, democracy spread around the world during the Cold War and accelerated after the Soviet collapse. More recently, crises of confidence in many countries over economic inequality, loss of personal status, changes in the workspace and other factors are taking us in the other direction. “Free” countries are declining. Authoritarianism is coming back, and perhaps we’re seeing a “springtime for autocrats”.

Free and open global trade, another hallmark of the Global Order, is not immune. The last three viable candidates for president of the United States in 2016 felt compelled to come out against trade in general and the Trans-Pacific Partnership in particular. Much of the electorate blamed “trade” for their stagnant or declining wages. We backed out of our own proposal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Dueling tariffs and economic uncertainty have been common since 2017. There is more than a whisper of isolationism in the U.S. and elsewhere.

Xi Jinping assumed leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and China with a conviction that he had to be “Redder than the Reddest” to rid the CCP of corruption and save the Communist Party. He re-centralized authority in Beijing, ended collective leadership, locked up party critics and purged many senior officers from the military and political hierarchy. Recently he abolished term limits, effectively assuming lifetime tenure at the top of the Party. In a major speech this past January, he solidly linked the unification of Taiwan to a signature theme: the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The intent seems clear.

In this volatile mix of problems, Hong Kong looks like a burning fuse. The camouflage that Hong Kong could be an economic city where politics remained somehow suspended in pursuit of business has been brutally rubbished. We’re 8 months or more into this crisis, and counting, with more than a quarter of the city’s residents in the streets and the airport to protest Chinese influence. It started with a proposed extradition law, but it’s well beyond that now. It’s a popular revolt against the Hong Kong government, and Chinese rule. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Peoples Armed Police forces conduct regular demonstrations intended to intimidate the demonstrators. Fierce denunciations and accusations are common.

Xi Jinping’s prestige is at stake, as well as his continued rule. Even autocratic leaders must worry about their core supporters, but one who has purged so many, and did away with succession, has likely made many enemies. They are quiet for now, but for how long? The pressure is on Xi to act.

Meanwhile, the people of Hong Kong seem ever more determined to press their case. Hong Kong’s seamless access to Western markets, its strong and legitimate banking sector, a stock market valuation nearly as high as China’s, and solid contract law practices are too valuable for China to easily discard, especially given internal economic issues. China needs Hong Kong commercially, now more than ever. But, the CCP well remembers how civil unrest and resistance can spread. It’s hard to see how this ends well.

The question seems to be whether this will be Tiananmen II, or something like Hungary in 1956 and Prague in 1968, or – optimistically - Berlin in November 1989 when the wall fell. No matter how this is settled, there will be no return to the status quo ante. Meanwhile, with rare exception, the nations of the world look on, seemingly paralyzed by lack of comprehension or lack of any viable options.

In this environment, Taiwan’s fundamental security threat remains political and coercive, with the PLA always present to show menace and intimidation. China is at war with the world, a war fought with fought largely for influence and control, using words, coercion, corruption, and violent covert operations. Taiwan’s strong military deterrence, backed by adept policy, is essential to resist this. Strong military deterrence provides the security shield to allow economic and political action to counter Chinese coercion.

The most critical component of deterrence is the human component of Taiwan's forces and Taiwan's political leadership. Taiwan's people must strongly believe that the government of Taiwan values, indeed treasures, the service of those who come forward to serve in the forces and the government. Those that choose to serve while their peers chose personal advancement and business success must realize commensurate benefits, in education and business, as a result of their service.

Only then will the armed forces have the service of highly qualified citizens who believe Taiwan's democracy is worth fighting for, and that Taiwan can prevail and prosper. There is no better investment a government can make than investing in the future success of those who signed a blank check to serve their nation and help to secure its future. President Tsai said, on the day of her inauguration, that the path to both a strong defense and better economy was through dual use technologies. The nurturing of the human "software" of defense and security might be an even better way.

The United States and Taiwan need a common vision on what China is doing and how to win against China's political warfare. We need to engage with Southeast Asia, regardless of China. We need a long-term strategy, updated frequently. We should consider using U.S. bases in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands for training, and rescind policies prohibiting naval exercises and personnel exchanges. More U.S. engagement across the Taiwan training establishment is needed. Taiwan should concentrate more on unofficial diplomatic partners rather than the official partners.



By Mark Stokes

(內文待補)

Expanded US Interests in Support of Taiwan



By Shirley Kan

Overview

The United States and Taiwan share overlapping interests to promote security, prosperity, democracy, and good governance around the world. The United States appreciates Taiwan's constructive roles, particularly with Pacific island countries. In addition, the Trump Administration has added new elements to U.S. policy concerning Taiwan. U.S. policy recognizes expanded interests for supporting Taiwan that include its democracy, constructive role in a free and open Indo-Pacific region, and diplomatic partnerships with Pacific island countries. In turn, the question is whether Taiwan uses this window of opportunity to strengthen its military and economic security as well as its partnership with the United States.

Overlapping Interests

The United States and Taiwan (formally called the Republic of China, or ROC) share overlapping interests in expanding democracy and good governance. Both Washington and Taipei promote the rule of law, civic space, and transparent and accountable governance to advance an Indo-Pacific region that is secure, open, inclusive, and rules-based.

Those interests overlap in the countries in the Pacific. As the PRC steadily has urged or coerced countries to switch diplomatic recognition to it, Taiwan has 15 remaining diplomatic "allies" (four are Pacific Island

countries): Marshall Islands (Freely Associated State of the U.S.), Nauru, Palau (Freely Associated State of the U.S.), Tuvalu, Eswatini, Holy See, Belize, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and Grenadines. Taiwan sponsors the Pacific Islands Leadership program at the East-West Center in Hawaii.

The United States and the Pacific Islands share a strong commitment to democracy, rule of law, peaceful resolution of disputes, and transparency. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced at the UN General Assembly on September 27, 2019 that the United States will provide \$15 million to promote sound, just, and responsive governance within the region to empower citizens, help combat corruption, and strengthen nations autonomy.

Also in September in Taipei, the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) hosted the first annual U.S.-Taiwan Consultations on Democratic Governance in the Indo-Pacific Region. Taiwan agreed to commit to advancing good governance, human rights, and anti-corruption efforts.

Expanded U.S. Interests

The Trump Administration has added new elements in expanded U.S. interests to support Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). First, U.S. officials have articulated expanded interests to include democracy in helping Taiwan to defend against the People's Republic of China (PRC)'s threats. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense David Helvey stated in 2018 that Taiwan's ability to resist coercion and deter aggression not only will safeguard peace and stability, but "most importantly, it will help protect the free and democratic way of life for the 23 million people of Taiwan." Assistant Secretary of Defense Randall Schriver said in April 2019 that "a strong and secure Taiwan can deter aggression, defend the Taiwan people and their hard-won democracy, and engage on its own terms with the PRC." In a speech at the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference in October, Helvey stated: "the Administration continues to faithfully implement the TRA as part of a broader commitment to the security and stability of the Indo-Pacific. As Assistant Secretary Randy Schriver has said, 'a strong and secure Taiwan can deter aggression, defend the Taiwan people and their hard-won democracy, and engage on its own terms with the PRC'."

Second, U.S. interests also include Taiwan as a part of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. As stated in the Defense Department's Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, U.S. support for Taiwan's self-defense features continuity in serving US and international interests in security, stability, and prosperity; Taipei's confident and peaceful contacts with Beijing; as well as Taiwan's unique role in showing a better, democratic path for the PRC.

Third, U.S. interests are served by Taiwan's diplomatic relationships, particularly in the Pacific Islands. For much of 2019, the U.S. National Security Council led the Trump Administration's work to encourage the Solomon Islands to maintain its diplomatic recognition of the ROC.

In summary, as Vice President Mike Pence said in a speech on October 24, "we've stood by Taiwan in defense of her hard-won freedoms. Under this administration, we've authorized additional military sales and recognized Taiwan's place as one of the world's great trading economies and beacons of Chinese culture and democracy." He added, "the international community must never forget that its engagement with Taiwan does not threaten the peace; it protects peace on Taiwan and throughout the region. America will always believe that Taiwan's embrace of democracy shows a better path for all the Chinese people."

Taiwan's Alignment with the U.S.

The US-Taiwan partnership can continue to grow if Taiwan's government and people choose not to fall into the PRC's traps, but continue to align with the United States and its allies and partners, especially Japan.

Taiwan is at a strategic crossroads. Congressional legislation shows the bipartisan character of U.S. support for Taiwan. Can the same be said for Taiwan's leaders as attention focuses on the presidential and legislative elections in January 2020? Will Taiwan's leadership support the momentum in sustaining a stronger Taiwan and a stronger partnership with the United States?

Taiwan might also examine whether there are weaknesses in its partnership with the United States. If a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, what is that weakest link?

Globalizing the U.S.-Taiwan Partnership: A New Equilibrium



By Russell Hsiao

This year marks the 40th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). Passed by the U.S. Congress in 1979, the TRA has provided an enduring framework for U.S.-Taiwan relations for nearly the past half century. This remarkable legislation mandated special reciprocal obligations and commitments that have helped to preserve peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and in the Western Pacific. Yet, much as strategic changes necessitated adjustments in U.S. policy during the Cold War with the Soviet Union, fundamental shifts in the 21st century, as former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said at a Project 2049 Institute and GTI forum earlier this year, require a “rethinking” of the U.S. approach to Taiwan policy.

The U.S.-Taiwan relationship is stronger now than it has ever been since 1979. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo praised Taiwan as “a democratic success story, a reliable partner and a force for good” and US Vice President Mike Pence recently highlighted:

The international community must never forget that its engagement with Taiwan does not threaten the peace; it protects peace on Taiwan and throughout the region. America will always believe that Taiwan’s embrace of democracy shows a better path for all the Chinese people.

As the U.S. has shown, through statements and legislation, arms sales, Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) initiatives, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, and many other projects and activities, it values Taiwan’s freedom and democracy. There are a lot of room for the US-Taiwan relationship

to grow and take on the role that is more commensurate to the island's place now as one of the United States' key security partner and democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific region, a world leader in information and communication technology, and as Vice President Pence also said, the "world's great trading economies and beacons of Chinese culture and democracy."

The starting point for this must be a recalibration of the trilateral relationship between Washington, Taipei, and Beijing. U.S. policy towards Taiwan does not exist in a vacuum, yet relations between Washington and Beijing over the last 40 years have had a disproportionate influence in how the United States conducted (and conducts) its informal relations with Taiwan. The current framework for the trilateral relationship between Washington, Taipei, and Beijing, which includes the TRA, Six Assurances, Three Communiqués, and the U.S. "One China" policy, requires recalibration. As the TRA makes clear: "It is the policy of the United States—

- to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan [...]
- to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern;" [emphasis added]

While a U.S. and Taiwan policy of maintaining the status quo has helped to maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait and remains the best near-term option, this is unsustainable in the long term. China is unceasingly and aggressively seeking to change the status quo through military and non-military means—and most visibly by its poaching of Taiwan's diplomatic allies. Moreover, the massive military buildup across the Strait by the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the Chinese leadership's continued refusal to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, and the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) non-military coercive pressure are destabilizing the Taiwan Strait and are threatening the peace and security of the Indo-Pacific area.

While the United States has managed to deter Beijing militarily from taking destructive military action against Taiwan over the last four decades, the risks of the U.S. approach inch dangerously close to outweighing its benefits as the PLA rapidly modernizes. Meanwhile, the CCP is intensifying its political infiltration and subversion activities through United Front and other "active measures"-like campaigns to affect the social and economic systems of Taiwan.


As the PLA grows stronger, a perceived lack of commitment that the U.S. will intervene in defense of Taiwan, which is shared in Taiwan and other countries in the region, could weaken morale in Taiwan and further embolden Beijing to use force to resolve the Taiwan issue. This is not only destabilizing the Taiwan Strait but also for the Western Pacific region.

In light of Beijing's continued refusal to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, it is incumbent upon analysts to at least question and consider the consequences if Beijing were to use force against Taiwan. For instance, if China uses force, what would prohibit Taiwan from declaring *de jure* independence? If Taiwan declares *de jure* independence because China uses force, what would prevent the U.S. from recognizing its independence? And, if U.S. recognizes Taiwan's independence, what would prevent US allies and partners from doing the same? In other words, if Beijing uses force, it would actually "lose" Taiwan. One has to wonder if these questions ever occurred to Beijing leaders.


To be sure, there is wide latitude for policymakers within the United States and Taiwan to work within the existing legal and policy framework. Yet, a necessary foundation to ensure the sustainability of peace over time is an affirmative policy of soft balancing by the United States that extends greater legitimacy to the democratic government in Taiwan. The PRC's coercive pressure campaign is aimed at gradually and unceasingly pushing for its own desired outcome: subverting the legitimacy of a democratically elected government and the freedom of its 23 million people by unifying Taiwan into the PRC.

Despite Washington's and Taipei's pragmatic approach, Beijing's approach is becoming more coercive, unilateral, and increasingly detrimental to U.S. interests. The U.S. needs to adopt a more affirmative Taiwan policy that not only insists on a peaceful process, but also provides an alternative substantive vision that, at the very least, reflects the objective reality that two legitimate, mutually non-subordinate political entities coexist across the Taiwan Strait in the international system—and actions that support this objective reality.


Follow us on the websites



TAIWAN
Thinktank 台灣智庫



 Global Taiwan Institute



 思想坦克
VoiceTANK