

## AGENDA

***U.S.-Taiwan Relations in a Free and Open Indo-Pacific:  
How to Face China's Sharp Power Collaboratively between Taiwan-U.S.?  
2018 2nd Annual TTT-GTI Conference on Taiwan-U.S. Relations***

*December 2, 2018, Taipei, Taiwan*

Institute of Diplomacy and International Affairs

No. 280, Section 1, Dun-Hua South Rd., Da-An District, Taipei City, 10691

**「建構印太新局下台美關係新架構」台美智庫國際論壇第二回合：  
台美如何共同面對中國銳實力？**

會議日期：2018年12月2日（星期日）09:30-12:00

地點：外交部外交及國際事務學院二樓國際會議廳

台北市大安區敦化南路一段280號（仁愛圓環旁）

\* 本次會議全程以英文進行，不備翻譯，尚祈見諒

09:30-10:00	Registration and Coffee – 2F Foyer 報到兼茶敘
10:00-10:10	<p><b>Welcome Remarks</b></p> <p>Speaker: Dr. Rong-I Wu   Chairman of the Taiwan Thinktank, Honorary Chairman of Global Taiwan Institute</p> <p><b>歡迎致詞：台灣智庫董事長、全球台灣研究中心榮譽董事長吳榮義博士</b></p>
10:10-11:50	<p><b>Roundtable: How to Face China's Sharp Power Collaboratively between Taiwan-U.S.?</b></p> <p>Moderator:</p> <p>Dr. I-Chung Lai</p> <p>Panelists:</p> <p>Amb. Stephen M. Young (ret.)</p> <p>Dr. William Stanton</p> <p>Mr. John Tkacik</p> <p>Ms. Shirley Kan</p> <p>Mr. Nien Su</p> <p>Mr. Mark Stokes</p> <p>Ms. Shihoko Goto</p> <p>Mr. J. Michael Cole</p> <p>Mr. Russell Hsiao</p>

10:10-11:50	<p><b>場次：台美如何共同面對中國銳實力？</b></p> <p>主持人： 賴怡忠   台灣智庫國際合作委員會主席</p> <p>與談人： 楊甦棣   前美國在台協會台北辦事處處長 司徒文   前美國在台協會台北辦事處處長 譚慎格   美國國際評估暨戰略中心「未來亞洲計畫」主任 簡淑賢   美國國會研究服務處（CRS）亞洲安全事務退休專家 蘇思年   前美國眾議院外交事務委員會擔任首席經濟顧問 石明凱   美國智庫「2049計畫研究所」執行主任 後藤志保子   伍德羅·威爾遜國際學者中心亞洲計畫資深東北亞副研究員 寇謐將   英國諾丁漢大學中國政策研究所台灣研究計畫的駐台北高級研究員、 法國現代中國研究中心副研究員、《台灣守護Taiwan Sentinel》總編輯 蕭良其   全球台灣研究中心執行長</p>
11:50-12:00	<p><b>Closing Remarks</b></p> <p>Dr. I-Chung Lai</p> <p><b>閉幕致詞：台灣智庫國際合作委員會主席賴怡忠博士</b></p>
End of Conference 會議結束	

\* Please visit [Slido.com](https://Slido.com) and enter the event code: [#T217](#) to submit or upvote the questions during the conference.  
會議進行期間，歡迎到網站 [Slido.com](https://Slido.com) 輸入代碼：[#T217](#) 提出或票選問題。





## Dr. Chia-Lung Lin

| Mayor of Taichung City  
and Former Chairman of the Taiwan Thinktank

## 林佳龍 博士

| 台中市長、前台灣智庫董事長

**Dr. Chia-Lung Lin** is the Mayor of Taichung City and the Former Chairman of the Taiwan Thinktank (TTT). Before becoming Mayor of Taichung City, Dr. Lin was a Legislator from February 2012 to November 2014. From 2007 to 2009 he was the Deputy Secretary-General at the Presidential Office, and the year prior to that, he was the DPP Secretary General. Dr. Lin also held many other important jobs, such as President of Taiwan Greater Taichung Development Association (2006-2014), Member of the National Assembly (2005), and Minister of the Government Information Office in the Executive Yuan (2004-2005). Furthermore, Dr. Lin was also a Cabinet Spokesperson, and an Advisor to the National Security Council. Dr. Lin held academic titles of Assistant Professor of National Chung Cheng University, and Visiting Associate Research Fellow at the United Nations University.

Dr. Lin holds a B.A. and M.A. from the Department of Political Science at the National Taiwan University. He also holds an additional M.A. in philosophy and political science, and a Ph.D. in political science from Yale University.



## Dr. I-Chung Lai

| Chairperson, Council for International Cooperation, Taiwan Thinktank

## 賴怡忠 博士

| 台灣智庫國際合作委員會主席

**Dr. I-Chung Lai** is the Chairperson of the Council for International Cooperation at Taiwan Thinktank (TTT), the President of the Prospect Foundation, and a Board Member of the International Affairs Committee of the Taichung City Government. In addition to these three titles, he is also an Assistant Professor at Mackay College for Medicine and Management. Prior to his current positions, Dr. Lai was the Vice President of Taiwan Thinktank from 2013 to 2016. Dr. Lai served as Director General for the Department of International Affairs (2007-2008) and Director General for the Department of China Affairs (2006-2008) in the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). From 2003 to 2006 he was the Director of the Foreign Policy Studies at the Taiwan Thinktank. Prior to this position, Dr. Lai was the Special Assistant for Policy to Taiwan's Representative to Japan (2000-2003), and the Executive Director for DPP Mission in the United States (1999-2000).

Dr. Lai received his Ph.D. degree from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech), and was a Visiting Researcher at Cornell University.





## Amb. Stephen M. Young

| Former Director, American Institute in Taiwan,  
Ambassador (ret.)

## 楊甦棣 博士

| 前美國在台協會台北辦事處處長

**Ambassador Stephen Young (ret.)** served as a U.S. diplomat for over 33 years, with assignments in Washington, Taipei, Moscow, Beijing, Bishkek, and Hong Kong. Amb. Young was Ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic, Director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), and Consul General in Hong Kong. Young first lived in Taiwan as a teen in the 1960's, when his father was a military assistance advisory group (MAAG) advisor to the Taiwan military. He lived a total of 11 years in Taiwan. Since retiring to his family home in New Hampshire in 2013, Young has been writing and speaking at seminars. He was a Visiting Professor at Wesleyan University last year, where he taught a seminar on Modern Chinese Foreign Policy.

He earned a B.A. at Wesleyan University and a Ph.D. in history at the University of Chicago.



## Dr. William Stanton

| Former Director, American Institute in Taiwan

## 司徒文 博士

| 前美國在台協會台北辦事處處長

**Dr. William (Bill) A. Stanton** is a Professor at National Taiwan University's International College since 2017, working to expand internationalization at NTU. From July 2013 through July 2017, Dr. Stanton served as the founding Director of the Center for Asia Policy at National Tsing Hua University (NTHU) in Taiwan and as the University's first George K. C. Yeh Distinguished Chair Professor of General Studies. From October 2014 through January 2016, Dr. Stanton also served as NTHU's Senior Vice President for Global Affairs.

Dr. Stanton previously worked for thirty-four years as a U.S. diplomat. His final posting was as Director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) from 2009 to 2012. During his tenure, AIT achieved significant progress on a number of key bilateral issues. For his overall contributions to U.S.-Taiwan relations, Taiwan awarded Dr. Stanton the Order of the Brilliant Star with Grand Cordon.

Dr. Stanton's other senior diplomatic assignments included Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, Korea (2006-2009) and at the U.S. Embassy in Canberra, Australia (2003-2006). During the latter assignment, he acted as *Chargé d'affaires ad interim* for some twenty-three months. His other Asia-related experience included: two three-year assignments (1987-1990 and 1995-1998) at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, the second as Minister Counselor for Political Affairs; Deputy Director for the Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs; and Special Assistant for East Asia and Pacific Affairs for the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Dr. Stanton also served as Director of the Office of Egyptian and North African Affairs; Director of the Office of UN Political Affairs; Political-Military Affairs Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad; Country Officer for Lebanon; Staff Assistant for the Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs; Watch Officer in the Department of State's Operations Center; and as a Consular and Political Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut.

Dr. Stanton earned a B.A. from Fordham University in New York, an M.A. and a Ph.D. in English literature from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He also spent a year studying at Albert-Ludwigs University in Freiburg, Germany.



## Mr. John Tkacik

Director of the Future Asia Project,  
Int'l Assessment and Strategy Center

## 譚慎格 先生

美國國際評估暨戰略中心  
「未來亞洲計畫」主任

**John Tkacik** has been Director of the Future Asia Project at the International Assessment and Strategy Center since 2012, following eight years at The Heritage Foundation where he co-wrote and edited two books on Taiwan and China. He also spent three years with R.J. Reynolds Tobacco International Asia both in Hong Kong and as a Consultant in Washington. He served in the United States Foreign Service for twenty-four years, fifteen of which in China- and Taiwan-related assignments, including tours in Taipei, Peking (now Beijing), Hong Kong, and Guangzhou, and as Chief of China Analysis in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State.

He was educated at Georgetown and Harvard universities.



## Ms. Shirley Kan

Former Specialist in Asian Security Affairs,  
Congressional Research Service

## 簡淑賢 女士

美國國會研究服務處 (CRS)  
亞洲安全事務退休專家

**Ms. Shirley Kan** is an Independent Advisor and Specialist, and a retired Specialist in Asian Security Affairs of the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service (CRS), a non-partisan agency of the U.S. Congress.

At CRS from 1990 to 2015, Shirley Kan wrote policy analyses and provided other legislative support to Congress as a Specialist in Asian Security Affairs. Her commendations include the CRS' Special Achievement Award for 25 years of dedicated service and commitment to Congress.

Ms. Kan has been a member of the Advisory Board of the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI), a think tank in Washington, D.C., since its founding in September 2016. She participates in conferences and is cited in the media as an independent specialist.

She also writes analyses that have appeared in publications that include: Project 2049 Institute's *AsiaEye*, GTI's *Global Taiwan Brief*, *National Interest*, Pacific Forum's *PacNet Newsletter*, *Taipei Times*, *The Diplomat*, the University of Nottingham's *Taiwan Insight*, and NBR's online "roundtable." See: <https://shirleykan.net/analyses/> Shirley Kan has specialized in national security interests in U.S. policies concerning the People's Republic of China (PRC) and concerning Taiwan. Her writings discuss policy concerns that include the challenges of weapons nonproliferation, counter-terrorism, military-to-military contacts, the PLA's modernization and missile buildup, U.S. security assistance for Taiwan's self-defense, the "one China" policy for supporting U.S. interests in the Taiwan Strait, and the defense buildup on Guam.

Ms. Kan attended the Commandant's National Security Program at the Army War College in July 2012. During the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996, she directly supported the Defense Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, for which she received the Defense Department's Special Achievement Award. In China in the summer of 1989, she reported on the pro-democracy movement and political-military crisis (i.e., the "Tiananmen Crackdown") while serving at the U.S. Consulate-General in Shenyang as the Political Intern.

Shirley Kan graduated *cum laude* from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service (SFS) in Washington, D.C., with a Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service and from the Rackham Graduate School of the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, MI.



## Mr. Nien Su

Former Chief Economic Advisor,  
the Foreign Affairs Committee in the U.S. House  
of Representatives

## 蘇思年 先生

前美國眾議院外交事務委員會  
擔任首席經濟顧問

**Nien Su** is the Chief Executive Officer of Artemis ESG, Inc. Artemis provides customized risk mitigation for global supply chain operators. Prior to founding Artemis, Mr. Su served as Chief Economic Advisor for the Foreign Affairs Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives. He was also the Director for International Corporate Affairs in Walmart's strategic initiatives unit supporting the company's long-term development priorities in China. Prior to joining Walmart, Mr. Su served in a number of positions in public service, including with the Foreign Affairs Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives, the Department of State, and the White House.

Mr. Su earned a B.A. in international affairs and an M.A. in legislative affairs from George Washington University, and an M.B.A. from the University of Arkansas' Walton School of Business. He is an Advisory Board Member of GWU's Graduate School of Political Management.





## Mr. Mark Stokes

| Executive Director, Project 2049 Institute

## 石明凱 先生

| 美國智庫「2049計畫研究所」執行主任

**Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Mark Stokes** is the Executive Director of the Project 2049 Institute. In addition to Taiwan issues, Mark's research focus includes Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force and Strategic Support Force, defense industry, military and political leadership, and cross-strait relations. Mark has served in a variety of military and private sector positions. A 20-year U.S. Air Force veteran, he served in intelligence, planning, and policy positions. From 1984-1989, he was assigned to the Philippines and West Berlin. After graduate school and Chinese language training, Mark served as Assistant Air Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing from 1992 to 1995. From 1995 to May 1997, he was assigned as a Strategic Planner within the U.S. Air Force Plans and Operations Directorate. Between 1997 and 2004, he served as Senior Country Director for China and Taiwan in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. After retiring from military service, he worked in the private sector on Taiwan for more than three years. Mark joined Project 2049 in 2008.

He holds a B.A. from Texas A&M University and graduate degrees in international relations and Asian studies from Boston University and the Naval Postgraduate School. He has working proficiency in Mandarin Chinese.



## Ms. Shihoko Goto

Senior Northeast Asia Associate,  
the Woodrow Wilson Center's Asia Program

## 後藤志保子 女士

伍德羅·威爾遜國際學者中心  
亞洲計畫資深東北亞副研究員

**Shihoko Goto** is the Senior Associate for Northeast Asia with the Wilson Center's Asia Program. She is also a contributing Editor to *The Globalist* and a Columnist for *The Japan Times*. In addition, she is a non-residential Senior Fellow at Morocco's Institute Amadeus and a Member of the Mansfield Foundation/Japan Foundation U.S.-Japan Network for the Future. Previously, Ms. Goto was a Financial Journalist focused on issues related to international political economy.

She received her B.A. in modern history from Oxford University, and her M.A. in international political theory from Waseda University, Tokyo.





## Mr. J. Michael Cole

Senior Fellow, China Policy Institute (University of Nottingham); Research Associate CEFC; Chief Editor, Taiwan Sentinel; Columnist, The National Interest, Jane's, Interpreter

## 寇謐將 先生

英國諾丁漢大學中國政策研究所台灣研究計畫的駐台北高級研究員、法國現代中國研究中心副研究員、《台灣守護Taiwan Sentinel》總編輯

**J. Michael Cole (寇謐將)** is a Taipei-based Senior Fellow with the China Policy Institute/Taiwan Studies Programme at the University of Nottingham, U.K.; Associate Researcher with the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China (CEFC); Chief-Editor of *Taiwan Sentinel*, and Deputy Coordinator of the Forum 2000's China Working Group. Mr. Cole is a former analyst of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in Ottawa. He worked at the Thinking Taiwan Foundation (小英教育基金會), a foundation created by future Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen in 2012, from 2014-2016, and was Deputy News Editor and a Columnist at the *Taipei Times*, Taiwan's largest English-language newspaper, between 2006-2013. His work has appeared in the *Wall Street Journal*, the *South China Morning Post*, *Foreign Policy*, *Globe and Mail*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, *The National Interest*, the *Diplomat*, *Lowy Interpreter*, *IISS Military Balance*, the Brookings Institution, CNN, the Prospect Foundation (遠景基金會), the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, and several others. He is a regular Commentator on *BBC*, *Al Jazeera*, and *Channel News Asia*, and a Consultant for various foreign governments and the defence industry. He has lectured at various universities in Taiwan and overseas. His latest book, "Convergence or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait," was published by *Routledge* in 2016. He is currently working on his sixth book, which analyses cross-strait relations since 2016, to be published (in Chinese language first) by *Business Weekly Publications* (商周出版) in 2019. Mr. Cole has been living in Taiwan since 2005.

Mr. Cole holds a Master's Degree in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC).



## Mr. Russell Hsiao

| Executive Director, Global Taiwan Institute

## 蕭良其 先生

| 全球台灣研究中心執行長

**Russell Hsiao** is the Executive Director of the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) and current Penn Kemble Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy. He previously served as a Senior Research Fellow at the Project 2049 Institute and National Security Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Prior to those positions he was the Editor of *China Brief* at The Jamestown Foundation from October 2007 to July 2011, and a Special Associate in the International Cooperation Department at the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy. While in law school, he clerked within the Office of the Chairman at the Federal Communications Commission and the Interagency Trade Enforcement Center at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.

Mr. Hsiao received his J.D. and certificate from the Law and Technology Institute at the Catholic University of America's Columbus School of Law, where he served as the Editor-in-Chief of the Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology. He received a B.A. in International Studies from the American University's School of International Service and the University Honors Program.

## How to Face China's Sharp Power Collaboratively Between the U.S. and Taiwan?

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**Ms. Shirley Kan** | Former Specialist in Asian Security Affairs, Congressional Research Service  
**簡淑賢 女士** | 美國國會研究服務處（CRS）亞洲安全事務退休專家

The United States and Taiwan could counter China's political warfare. With experience in political warfare, tradition of rectification of names (*zhengming*, 正名), and the official title of the ROC, Taiwan can increase strategic communication to rectify the wrong narrative pushed by PRC political warfare. The ROC's legacy offers a competing vision for democratic values in a Chinese-speaking community. An accurate historic narrative could counter China's political warfare that portrays itself as a so-called "victim" of Western imperialism that is entitled to justify a stronger military for potential use of force and coercion. As Vice President Mike Pence noted in his speech on October 4, "When China suffered through indignities and exploitation during her so-called 'Century of Humiliation,' America refused to join in, and advocated the 'Open Door' policy, so that we could have freer trade with China, and preserve their sovereignty..." In another example, at the press conference of the U.S.-China Diplomatic and Security Dialogue on November 9, General Wei Fenghe (魏鳳和) said: "[Taiwan] is an inalienable part of China. So if there - it's - this territorial integrity is under threat, we will do it at any cost just like what the U.S. side had in Civil War." However, in an accurate analogy of the Civil War, the ROC is the National forces (Lincoln's Federal forces) and the Communists are the rebels to harm the country (Confederate rebels).

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**Ms. Shihoko Goto** | Senior Northeast Asia Associate, the Woodrow Wilson Center's Asia Program  
**後藤志保子 女士** | 伍德羅·威爾遜國際學者中心亞洲計畫資深東北亞副研究員

When it comes to economic power, Taiwan certainly punches above its weight on the global stage. When it comes to using sharp power, however, Taiwan has yet to realize its full potential. The manipulation of facts and repression of information has become an increasing challenge worldwide at a time when populist nationalism is on the rise. Taiwan's unwavering strength lies in its commitment to democracy, freedom of speech, adherence to the rule of law, and perhaps most importantly, respect for diversity. These are the core values that undoubtedly distinguishes Taiwan from the PRC, and they are also the values that unite like-minded countries.

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**Mr. Nien Su** | Former Chief Economic Advisor, the Foreign Affairs Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives

**蘇思年 先生** | 前美國眾議院外交事務委員會擔任首席經濟顧問

China's "sharp power" is on the rise across the Asia-Pacific. U.S.-Taiwan cooperation is vital to maintaining peace and prosperity in this critically important part of the world. Formal economic, trade, and political agreements between Washington and Taipei are mutually beneficial and necessary for Taiwan's long-term security. Given our shared values in democracy, freedom, and free markets, it makes sense that we strengthen Taiwan's place in the world through active collaboration and engagement. Furthermore, helping Taiwan gain a permanent role at important international organizations such as the World Health Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization will not only make the world a safer place but it will allow Taiwan the opportunity to prosper and flourish. After all, a strong and economically vibrant Taiwan is one of the most important ingredients in peace and prosperity across the Pacific Ocean.

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**Mr. John Tkacik** | Director of the Future Asia Project, Int'l Assessment and Strategy Center

**譚慎格 先生** | 美國國際評估暨戰略中心「未來亞洲計畫」主任

For 70 years, America's grand strategy has demanded that "island Asia be kept out of the hands of mainland Asia," a precept that always included Taiwan. President Trump's counteroffensive to China's "sharp power" campaign against Taiwan began seven months ago on May 5, 2018, by deriding Beijing's bizarre views on Taiwan as "Orwellian Nonsense." The State Department then recalled envoys from Latin American capitals that recently derecognized Taipei. Behind the scenes, Washington seems to be shoring up Taipei's position in other wavering capitals. These moves temporarily flummoxed China's diplo-propaganda machine. But blunting China's "sharp power" requires persistent, protracted commitment achievable only in multilateral cooperation. 1) Washington can expand its "freedom of navigation" objectives to Taiwan's exclusive economic zone, including the Taipei-administered South China Sea islands; 2) a U.S.-Japan-Taiwan consensus on mutual security; 3) persuading other Indo-Pacific actors of Taiwan's importance to a unified stance on regional stability. The Trump administration is willing, but cannot progress without Taipei's cooperation or the will of Indo-Pacific partners.

## Countering China's Sharp Power: What are the United States' Options?

By Ambassador Stephen M. Young (ret.)

*Ambassador Stephen M. Young (ret.) served as a U.S. diplomat for over 33 years, with assignments in Washington, Taipei, Moscow, Beijing, Kyrgyzstan, and Hong Kong. He is a Member of GTI's Advisory Board.*

There is no question that Chinese strongman Xi Jinping has increased his country's focus on pressing Taiwan into further concessions, aimed at foreshortening the time before the island might feel compelled to cut some sort of deal with the mainland that diminishes its status. The goal of course is reunification on Beijing's terms. I do find one small and ironic glimmer of hope. Since Xi has apparently now appointed himself leader for life, and no doubt hopes to live another 25-30 years, maybe his timetable for Taiwan's reunification (read surrender) isn't that short!

But in all seriousness, the people of Taiwan have every right to feel new pressure from the mainland to compromise on the essential elements of their *de facto* independence. That is where the longstanding commitment on the part of the United States to prevent any coercion or attack on the island becomes so important.

Washington regularly reiterates its commitment to the Three Communiques, the Six Assurances and the criticality of any resolution to the Taiwan question being peaceful. More practically, Washington continues to approve arms sales to Taiwan, aimed as ensuring it has the necessary capability to respond to any threat or use of force by the mainland. Our Congress has become even more outspoken in its determination to ensure Taiwan's self-defenses are adequate to the expanding threat.

Of course, Taiwan has to budget and pay for the weapons purchases that stem from this commitment, something that President Tsai has been working toward, despite ever-present budgetary constraints. It would be helpful if Taiwan moved more expeditiously to increase the overall percentage of its budget allocated to vital defense needs, especially given the dramatic expansion of the mainland's defense spending.

Over time, I hope our Congress and Administration will take a more creative approach to the question of supporting Taiwan's development of submarine capabilities as well as the need for a post-F-16 fighter plane solution to its air defense needs. But for the time being, this process must grapple with President Trump's apparent bromance with the thuggish Mr. Xi, as well as the American leader's more general lack of focus on foreign affairs.

I welcome the robust U.S. military response to Chinese belligerency in the Far East. Our ships and planes continue to challenge the egregious annexation of the South China Sea islands, followed by the steady building up of those islets by the PLA. Not only Beijing's behavior fly in the face of the 2016 decision by the International Court of Justice to dismiss China's territorial claims, in a case brought by the Philippine

Government. It also ignores international practice in assigning territorial rights based on the Law of the Sea, coastal waters and other traditional standards. China's actions under Mr. Xi smack of the same sort of disregard for international standards that accompanied Adolph Hitler's steady encroachment on his neighbors' territory back in the 1930's. We all remember where that ended up.

Sailing U.S. Naval vessels through the Taiwan Strait is another way of telegraphing to China's authoritarian leadership that the United States remains committed to Taiwan's security, in words as well as actions. This stands for attempts by China to intimidate our ally partners in Japan over the Diaoyutai islands, and more generally our commitment to the *status quo* and peaceful resolution of disputes throughout East Asia generally. I would also support a decision to send one of our aircraft carriers through the Strait again, as a symbolic demonstration of America's enduring commitment to Taiwan's defense.

Washington's warming relations with Vietnam, over forty years after we withdrew our last troops from Saigon, marks another important trend in U.S. policy toward the region. Let us put aside the egregious miscalculation back then -- that viewed North Vietnam's aggression toward the South as a manifestation of "Red Chinese" expansion -- as the impetus for our involvement in what was essentially an internal civil war. The underlying fallacy was of a uniform communist bloc intent on expanding its territorial holdings through military aggression. The breakup of the Sino-Soviet alliance and its replacement by nationalist themes and border disputes, put the lie to an old Cold War shibboleth.

But back to Taiwan. We should continue to emphasize our enduring ties to the island, built upon decades of economic and political cooperation. A supporting trend has been the large-scale immigration of Taiwan citizens to the U.S., generating a growing domestic element to our friendly relations. Millions of Chinese-Americans with roots to Taiwan have become an important new voice with respect to American cross-strait issues.

We should renew efforts to nail down a Free Trade Agreement with Taiwan at an early date. For its part, Taipei should push back on its pesky agricultural lobby and find an early solution to disputes over pork and beef restrictions. It has become more difficult in the Trump era to champion regional economic and trade organizations. But Taiwan should be accorded continuing full access to and participation in these groupings, including APEC, TPP, WTO, ASEAN and other vital Asian gatherings. It has earned its inclusion by its sterling economic performance and its willingness to be a team player on regional issues of common interest.

Congressional legislation has encouraged more senior level visits by U.S. officials to Taiwan. There is a track record of having cabinet-level U.S. officials visit the island to discuss economic and trade issues. I see no reason why this could not be expanded to include law enforcement issues and any other senior representatives whose portfolio aligns with the broad brand of overlapping U.S.-Taiwan interests.

In sum, there remain plenty of areas where my country can enhance its cooperation with our longtime friends in Taiwan. Just as Mr. Xi's Beijing seems willing to push the envelope -- at the risk of heightened tensions -- so the United States can and should make it clear that our own commitment to Taiwan's survival and self-defense is as solid as ever. I believe such actions would not only hearten spirits in Taiwan, but also reinvigorate confidence in America's commitment to a free and prosperous Asia-Pacific region.



## Another PRC Sharp Power: Foreign “Friends”

By Dr. William Stanton

*Dr. William Stanton is a professor at National Taiwan University. Dr. Stanton previously served for 34 years as a U.S. diplomat, and his final posting was as Director of the American Institute in Taiwan (2009-2012). Dr. Stanton's other senior assignments included Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, Korea (2006-2009) and at the U.S. Embassy in Canberra, Australia (2003-2006). Dr. Stanton is a member of GTI's Advisory Board.*

### At Long Last, A U.S. Policy Shift toward China

After more than 40 years, U.S. policy toward China is finally changing, recognizing the reality of China as it is rather than the China we wish it were. A strong and still growing consensus has emerged among U.S. Government officials, the U.S. Congress, and American elite, media, and public opinion, and even among many business people, that the U.S. relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC) is unbalanced and does not serve U.S. interests.

Although many China experts had been saying this for many years, the public acknowledgment of how badly U.S. policy toward China has failed was perhaps most prominently announced earlier this year in the March/April issue *Foreign Affairs* essay on “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations” by Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner. They wrote:

“Nearly half a century since Nixon's first steps toward rapprochement, the record is increasingly clear that Washington once again put too much faith in its power to shape China's trajectory. All sides of the policy debate erred: [...]free traders and financiers [...]integrationists [...] and hawks [...] Neither carrots nor sticks have swayed China as predicted. Diplomatic and commercial engagement have not brought political and economic openness. Neither U.S. military power nor regional balancing has stopped Beijing from seeking to displace core components of the U.S.-led system. And the liberal international order has failed to lure or bind China as powerfully as expected.”

Predictably, some stalwart U.S. defenders of the *status quo* liked Ambassador Stapleton Roy, who helped create U.S. policy toward China, sharply objected. Nonetheless, the surprise is not that the U.S. policy toward the PRC is finally being revised. The wonder is that it took so long.

After all, U.S. policies toward the PRC have been remarkably consistent since the February 27, 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, but consistency does not mean correct or successful. U.S. policies have repeatedly been proven



wrong, and consistently failed to promote U.S. interests and to achieve U.S. goals. The original geostrategic justification for U.S. relations with China was short-sighted and ultimately foolish, and died with the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. China and Russia today are closely aligned if not allied, both militarily and politically.

The concrete benefits of supposed US-PRC cooperation on key issues have been few to none, whether the issues have been ending the Vietnam War sooner, non-proliferation (whether Pakistan, Iran, or North Korea), the Russian invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine, or human rights.

The argument that economic cooperation and trade with China would positively transform China proved to be wrong. And while bilateral trade with China may have benefitted some U.S. business sectors, such as investment banks, it did not benefit the U.S. economy overall, especially if IPR theft and job losses are taken into account.

Meanwhile, while investing so much hope in the PRC, U.S. Administrations consistently underestimated and often ignored Taiwan, a modern miracle that over the same period of time transformed itself into a vibrant and prosperous democracy and a technological powerhouse.

The irony of our overly solicitous approach to China would have been even more apparent if U.S. Administrations had paid more attention to what the Chinese were themselves saying about relations with the United States. For example, Tsing Hua University Beijing academic Yan Xuetong (閻學通), a foreign policy adviser to whom the PRC Government pays attention, wrote as long ago as 2010: “The global importance today of China-U.S. relations is similar to that of U.S.-Soviet relations during the cold war in being based on conflicting interests rather than common ones.[...] There are more mutually unfavorable interests than mutually favorable ones between China and the United States.” It is all the more strange then that fearful critics of any shift in U.S. policy toward China declare we run the risk of creating a Cold War with China.

### American Friends Enabling China

In trying to understand why Washington has persisted so long with policies that have not served U.S. interests, we should not overlook the continuing enormous influence of U.S. officials, both in office and after retiring, on U.S. policy. Beijing has consistently used these “American friends” as enablers to promote Chinese interests and Chinese goals, and has richly rewarded them for doing so.

The most famous example of this is Henry Kissinger, former National Security Adviser and Secretary of State to both Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. During a visit to China on June 28, 2011 commemorating the 40th anniversary of his secret mission to Beijing, Kissinger admitted, according to *China Daily*, that “when he first came to China, he knew little about the country, but now he admires the Chinese people and Chinese history.” He also stated that “[t]he U.S.’ primary interest is a good relationship with China, not provoking difficulties with it.[...]”

Kissinger’s view that the Sino-American relationship is of surpassing importance in its own right has, in fact,

been his guiding policy principle toward China. The relationship itself, according to this view, outweighs all individual issues, disputes, and differences. In contrast, we should contrast the view of Secretary of State George Shultz's view as described in his memoir *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (1993). Shultz specifically rejected the geostrategic importance of China as the "conceptual prism through which Sino-American relations were viewed," arguing that when that was the case, "it was almost inevitable that American policymakers became overly solicitous of Chinese interests, concerns, and sensitivities." In implicit contrast to Kissinger, Shultz advised "that it would be a mistake to place too much emphasis on a relationship for its own sake." Instead, he said, "A good relationship should emerge from the ability to solve substantive problems of interest to both countries." He added:

"We [President Reagan and I] viewed China as a giant crippled by its own ideology. So long as China pursued that ideology, there would necessarily be restraints on the kind of relationship it could have with the United States. There would always be a gap between what we expected from one another and what we would be willing to deliver. We would continue to do what we could to maintain and, whenever possible, improve relations, but we would not abandon our fundamental values or principles in dealing with the Chinese."

In this regard, Secretary of Shultz and President Reagan stood apart from most of the other U.S. policy makers who followed in the footsteps of President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger. Ever since leaving government in fact, Kissinger has continued to serve as a loyal supporter and continuing advocate of the appeasing policies toward China he initiated. Every time there was a fissure in U.S.-China relations, Kissinger could be counted on to rush into the breach.

Thus it was on November 7-10, 1989, when U.S.-China relations were still roiled by the Tiananmen Massacre that Kissinger visited Beijing to meet with supreme leader Deng Xiaoping, Chinese Premier Li Peng, General Secretary Jiang Zemin, President Yang Shangkun, and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. They all warmly received Kissinger as "old friend" who, moreover, had spoken up in defense of the Tiananmen crackdown: "[n]o government in the world," he had written, "would have tolerated having the main square of its capital occupied for eight weeks by tens of thousands of demonstrators who blocked the authorities from approaching the area in front of the main Government building." Kissinger had also criticized U.S. sanctions imposed in response to the Tiananmen massacre, and repeatedly called for preserving a special Sino-American relationship despite differences. Kissinger's visit followed a visit a week earlier by former President Richard M. Nixon, who had strongly criticized the military massacre, and would itself be followed in December with a visit by Brent Scowcroft, seeking to strike a deal for the release of the dissident Fang Lizhi and his wife who had sought refuge in the U.S. Embassy.

Another of the more than 50 visits Kissinger made to Beijing was on December 2, 2016 where he met with President Xi Jinping in an apparent effort to assure the PRC leader that, following the election of President Trump, he hoped and expected Sino-U.S. relations would move ahead in a "sustained and stable manner."

More recently, on November 8 this year, in a clear sign that the orthodox Sino-U.S. relationship he had helped create was in trouble, we saw Kissinger – now 95-years old – once again rushing to Beijing to try to assuage Sino-U.S. tensions. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi reportedly told Kissinger "[a]s the last 40 years have shown,

the common interests of the United States and China far outweigh the conflicts, and the cooperation between the two countries is the only right choice.” Kissinger, according to the Foreign Ministry, said the two countries should view bilateral ties from a big-picture perspective and establish basic rules for the stable development of relations. It was as if nothing had changed in the last 40 years.

### The Financial Connections of Foreign Friends

While there can be no doubt of Kissinger’s personal conviction about the strategic importance of Sino-U.S. ties and how best to foster them, it is also true that the consulting firm he founded, Kissinger Associates, had earned millions of dollars over the years arranging access in Beijing and even meetings with senior PRC leaders for U.S. corporations. In a telephone interview with *The New York Times* on December 13, 1989, Kissinger described as “McCarthyism” any linking of his views on China to his business interests. Although Kissinger has always maintained this position, his business interests in China have certainly created the impression that there might be a conflict of interest.

This is an issue that goes well beyond Henry Kissinger. In *China Fantasy: Why Capitalism Will Not Bring Democracy to China* (2007), James Mann describes how China in effect “bought” retired U.S. officials to influence U.S. policies in China’s favor. He names the many American political leaders – Democrats as well as Republicans – who left office and went on Beijing’s payroll as “consultants” to introduce Americans seeking to do business in China to Chinese officials, including – besides Kissinger – former Secretaries of State Alexander Haig, Madeleine Albright, former National Security Advisers Brent Scowcroft and Sandy Berger, former Secretary of Defense William Cohen, and former U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills.

In this context, it is important to note the remarks on November 9 by White House National Trade Council Director Peter Navarro who accused Wall Street “globalist billionaires” of trying to sabotage President Trump’s handling of trade relations with China. In a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Navarro said:

“Consider the shuttle diplomacy that is now going on by a self-appointed group of Wall Street bankers and hedge fund managers between the U.S. and China.[...]As part of the Chinese government influence operations, globalist billionaires are putting a full-court press on the White House in advance of the G-20 in Argentina (where a meeting is planned between Trump and Xi Jinping later this month). [...] The mission of these unregistered foreign agents [...] is to pressure this President into some kind of a deal.[...] If Wall Street continues to insinuate itself into these negotiations, there will be a stench, a stench around any deal that is consummated.”

Navarro did not name names in his speech, but according to Doug Palmer in *Politico* on November 9, Navarro mentioned U.S. financial services giant Goldman Sachs several times. Palmer also noted that in a recent talk in Singapore, Henry Paulson, a former Treasury secretary who once led Goldman Sachs, referred to his “friend” Chinese Vice President Wang Qishan and raised fears of an “economic iron curtain” being raised between the U.S. and China. “Nobody wins a trade war,” he said. “And China can agree to enough of what President

Trump seeks to enable a deal that he can be proud of — if it also marks the beginning of the negotiation of a high-ambition trade or investment agreement.” Palmer also noted that “[s]ome analysts regard Navarro's comments as a dig at Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, who worked at Goldman Sachs from 1985 to 2002 and later helped establish several hedge funds. Mnuchin is generally viewed as less of a hardliner on China than Navarro or U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer.”

The mention of Goldman Sachs is especially interesting because Kissinger Associates was established in 1982 partly with loans from Goldman Sachs. Other Goldman Sachs connections to China are notable. John Thornton, who retired as Chairman of Goldman Sachs in 2003, took up an academic position as Professor and Director of the Global Leadership Program at Tsinghua University in Beijing, but continued to advise Goldman Sachs on China matters. At the time of his retirement, Goldman had become the lead underwriter for major Chinese state-owned companies, a relationship he helped build over the previous two decades. In 2006 Thornton funded the establishment of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. In 2009, he also became a member of the International Advisory Council of the Chinese sovereign wealth fund China Investment Corporation.

Another American corporate booster of Sino-U.S. ties is Stephen Schwarzman, chairman and CEO of the Blackstone Group. In 2013 he announced a \$100 million personal gift to establish and endow a scholarship program in China, Schwarzman Scholars, modeled after the Rhodes scholarship program. Schwarzman simultaneously announced a fundraising campaign with a goal of \$200 million. In 2008, he was awarded the Friendship Award of the People's Republic of China, the highest honor accorded to a non-Chinese citizen. The Chinese government also named him as one of fifteen 'foreign experts' who have made the most significant contribution to China's development over the past three decades. John Thornton also supported the launch of the Schwarzman Scholarship in 2013, attending its launch at Tsinghua University, and serving as an advisory board member. It is evident in both cases that their philanthropy is closely tied to their business interests in China.

### Foreign “Friends” as a Tool of Sharp Power

Since there is much debate about the definition of “sharp” power, but it is also commonly agreed that it a form of “hard” power, I would argue that providing financial incentives to foreign friends to support certain policies toward China is certainly not soft power. It therefore also meets the original November 2017 definition of “sharp power” by the National Endowment for Democracy as “aggressive and subversive policies employed by authoritarian governments as a projection of state power in democratic countries, policies that cannot be described as either hard power or soft power.” It is certainly true that the PRC government would never allow any its own current and former officials and businesspeople to advocate policies in China that would be more favorable to the United States. In the case of foreign “friends” of China, “sharp power” also meets Joseph Nye’s definition of “coerced or purchased loyalty.”

A recent book by conservative American author Peter Schweizer -- *Secret Empires: How the American Political Class Hides Corruption and Enriches Family and Friends* (2018) -- documents a number of troubling cases involving both Democrats and Republicans that illustrate how “China employs a strategy with other countries to make

friends with foreign officials and politicians to advance their interests [... and] to score favorable policies.” To cite just three examples:

- The son of Vice President Joe Biden and the stepson of Secretary of State John Kerry profited immensely from secret deals involving billions of dollars that they struck with companies connected to the Chinese government. These deals occurred as Biden and Kerry themselves were negotiating sensitive issues with the Chinese government, and the deals may have influenced the relatively “soft” positions Biden and Kerry adopted on such issues as the Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea and the South China Sea dispute.
- Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and his Taiwan-born wife, current Secretary of Transportation Elaine Chao, who also previously served under George W. Bush as Secretary of Labor, have enormously profited from close family ties to the Chinese military-industrial complex. The Senator’s father-in-law James Chao – who was a classmate of Jiang Zemin at Jiao Tung University in China decades earlier – and his sister-in-law have both served on the board of directors of a Chinese – owned military contractor, and another sister-in-law has been appointed to the board of the government-controlled Bank of China, only the second foreign national to do so. While the father-in-law James Chao’s shipping company is based in the United States, Chinese government shipyards have constructed their ships, the Chinese government has financed some of the construction, the ships’ crews are largely Chinese, and the ships largely operate out of Chinese ports carrying large amounts of materials in and out of China. Senator McConnell and his wife Secretary Chao have increasingly refrained from any criticism of China as the family’s business ties expanded.
- The Trump family also has extensive business ties in China. In March 2017 the Chinese government finally granted the family 37 trademarks for various Trump projects after more than a decade of refusing to approve them. On the day of Trump’s Mar-a Lago dinner with Xi Jinping, government Chinese approved Ivanka’s company’s request to sell handbags, jewelry, and spa services in China. Until media coverage scotched the deal, son-in-law Jared Kushner had negotiated a tentative deal with Anbang Insurance Group to invest in Jared’s financially troubled showcase Manhattan building “666.” Meanwhile, the Trump Organization owes hundreds of millions of dollars to the Bank of China for real estate projects.

Lest it be thought that I am only picking on the United States, former Australian leaders and officials have also had their share of issues:

- After former Foreign Minister and New South Wales Premier Bob Carr was appointed as the head of the Australia China Relations Institute at the University of Technology in Sydney in 2014, media reports indicate he has “come to personify the lobby he once attacked, lauding the achievements of Xi Jinping and condemning his critics.”<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> “How Bob Carr became China’s pawn,” *The Australian Financial Review*, November 8, 2018, <https://www.afr.com/opinion/what-you-should-know-about-bob-carr-and-china-20181105-h17jic>

- Former Prime Minister Paul Keating, who now serves on the International Advisory Council of the China Development Bank, has criticized the Australian government for having a “containment strategy” against China.
- Former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, according to a friend of mine who is in a position to know, is on the boards of several major Chinese corporations. Rudd takes an increasingly very moderate line on China. His daughter has a lucrative business selling baby formula and other organic Aussie goods to the Chinese market, and also serves as the Australian ambassador for Chinese e-commerce giant Alibaba.

### How to Counter China's Foreign Friends Among Us

I don't know enough about the linkages some Taiwanese may have with China, but I think the basic strategy for any country facing this kind sharp power threat, includes three essential measures:

1. Support media and police efforts to unmask hidden profits, and illegal or corrupt connections to China.
2. Create legislation to make it more difficult for family members to do back-door deals. For example, U.S. law prevents U.S. corporations from hiring or doing special business deals with the children of foreign officials, but it does not prevent foreign entities from hiring or doing special deals with children of U.S. officials. Such issues must be addressed.
3. Ensure that the China receives reciprocal treatment to the greatest extent possible, whether the issue is numbers of journalists, numbers of Confucius Institutes, or restrictions on travel or business.



## Countering Chinese Communist Party Statecraft: A System of Systems Framework

By Mark Stokes

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Political warfare, or sharp power, is a critical component of Chinese statecraft. States influence policies of others, to varying degrees, in order to secure respective national interests. Governments strive to influence emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to one's own political-military objectives.

As a Leninist party-state, however, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are different. The Chinese party-state relies on authoritarian statecraft to define and influence the discourse of international relations, including interference inside democracies. The importance of political warfare in Chinese statecraft stems from the authoritarian nature of its political system. Seeking to reframe perceptions of objective reality, Leninist statecraft adopts extraordinary measures to shore up legitimacy domestically, reframe international rules of the road, and promotes autocratic alternatives to widely accepted universal values.

Guided by the doctrinal principle of “uniting with friends and disintegrating enemies,” Chinese statecraft, operating as a system of systems, mobilizes resources to promote the rise of China within a new international order and defend against perceived threats to sovereignty and territorial integrity. As a Leninist party-state, Chinese political warfare integrates intelligence, strategic psychological operations, propaganda, and united front work as means to influence targeted parties in the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded democracies. Chinese statecraft employs coercive persuasion against audiences in the United States and Taiwan to weaken resolve and compel courses of action favorable to Beijing's interests. Propaganda amplifies or attenuates the political and psychological effects of economic and military instruments of national power.

Taking advantage of U.S. ambivalence regarding Taiwan's international political legitimacy, the CCP has been steadfast in imposing its “One China Principle” on the U.S. through a long term, concerted influence campaign. Viewing political legitimacy as a zero-sum game and applying its so-called “One China Principle” internationally, the CCP seeks further political isolation of Taiwan and co-management of U.S.-Taiwan relations as means to coerce the island's democratically elected leadership into a political settlement on terms favorable to Beijing. Overtly or covertly, authorities have sought to influence an amendment to the Taiwan



Relations Act, the legal U.S. basis for bilateral relations since the break in diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC) in 1979.

Relying heavily on formal and informal party, state, and military organizations as instruments of statecraft, Chinese influence operations can be viewed from a systems-of-systems perspective. Notionally, the five systems consist of external affairs, propaganda and ideology, united front work, the military and security community, and economic and finance work. As compared with other targeted countries, authorities in Beijing dedicate relatively significant resources toward influencing U.S. policy toward Taiwan.

- **External Affairs.** For operations on U.S. territory, the external affairs system, guided by the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, appears dominant. Party and state actors include the Central International (Liaison) Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, organs of the State Council and National People's Congress, and associated platforms. The external affairs system most likely functions as the principle interlocking mechanism for authoritarian influence in the United States.
- **Propaganda/Ideology.** China's propaganda and ideology system is global in reach. Under Central Propaganda and Ideology Leading Small Group guidance, the Central Propaganda Department functions as the nerve center. System integrates the work of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), Ministry of Education, Ministry of Culture, China Academy of Social Sciences, People's Daily, New China News Agency (Xinhua), and the State Administration for Radio, Film, and Television. Beijing's propaganda system actively seeks to manipulate broader American public perceptions of China, leveraging media outlets, education, and culture to manage public perceptions within American society. The propaganda and ideology system is particularly active on U.S. university campuses.
- **United Front.** The united front work system, guided by Central United Front Leading Small Group (中央統戰工作領導小組) and Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC, 中國人民政治協商會議(政協)), generally targets ethnic Chinese and Asian-American communities in the U.S., in part mobilizing support for Chinese Communist Party policies regarding Taiwan, Tibet, Falungong, One Belt One Road, and a host of other issues. Activities carried out on U.S. territory appear to be guided by the Overseas Chinese Section within the PRC Embassy and five consulates. The Leading Small Group and CPPCC are significant players in Beijing's cross-Strait policymaking.
- **Military/Political-Legal.** The People's Liberation Army (PLA), guided by the Central Military Commission (CMC), along with the political-legal community, are perhaps the most prominent employers of Chinese sharp power targeting Taiwan. The CMC Political Work Department Liaison Bureau probably assumed most of the responsibilities of the former General Political Department Liaison Department. They also are active in shaping U.S. national security policy, including Taiwan-related defense policy and planning.
- **Economic/Finance.** The economic and finance system targets U.S. economic, trade, and technology policies and supports other facets of Chinese statecraft. Under leadership of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission, this system leverages economic statecraft to support national plans, such as Made in China 2025. State-owned enterprises,

party controlled companies, and individual corporatist entrepreneurs are instrumental in the work of the previous four systems.

Because public information is limited, assessments regarding the effectiveness of Chinese Leninist statecraft can be a speculative endeavor. Autocratic regimes, in comparison to democracies, may enjoy a relative advantage in the ability to mobilize and focus resources needed to manipulate perceptions and influence foreign policies. On the other hand, open societies enjoying a free and open press may be better positioned to counter authoritarian influence.

All five systems of influence are heavily weighted toward bringing U.S. into line with Beijing's positions regarding Taiwan. Reflecting its relative importance, the most significant and enduring success of Chinese sharp power over the last over the last 50 years may be U.S. cross-Strait policy. Taiwan, under its current ROC constitution, exists as an independent, sovereign state. While progress has been made, the U.S. and the broader international community have yet to align policies with this objective reality. Reflecting its own Cold War mentality, Beijing's intransigence in recognizing the political legitimacy of Taiwan remains one of the most significant obstacles to regional peace and stability.

## Chinese Interference in Taiwan's Electoral Mechanisms: Means and Aims

By J. Michael Cole (寇謐將)

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Efforts by China to influence and interfere in democratic processes in Taiwan go back several years. In the mid-1990s, the Chinese regime used military exercises in an attempt to influence the 1996 presidential elections — the first free and direct public selection of a Taiwanese leader in the nation's history. Overt threats, however, backfired and contributed to the election of the candidate whose defeat Beijing had sought to engineer.

Since then, the Chinese regime has refined its influence tactics, and sought instead to prop up, through propaganda, financial assistance, and other means, candidates which it regarded as more amenable to Beijing's unification strategy. For many years, this meant helping Kuomintang (KMT) politicians and a handful of others from pro-unification parties like the New Party. At some point during the second term of the Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) Administration, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) lost faith in the KMT's ability to deliver on unification efforts. This was largely the result of democratic forces compelling KMT politicians to increasingly reflect the wishes of the Taiwanese population, and the knowledge that Taiwanese voters would use electoral retribution against those who failed to do so. The KMT's decision to switch out its initial candidate, Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱), ahead of the January 2016 general elections, sealed the KMT's fate.<sup>1</sup> Months later, People's Liberation Army (PLA) Major General Zhu Chenghu (朱成虎), an influential commentator, publicly bemoaned the KMT's apparent lack of initiative on unification.<sup>2</sup>

Beijing has now intensified its efforts to bypass both the central government in Taiwan and, increasingly, the two main political parties, the KMT and the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Instead, it relies more and more on co-opted candidates, political parties, and various proxies in Taiwan to undermine democratic institutions, sow confusion within the public, and engineer electoral outcomes in its favor. This strategy is both an admission that previous strategies have failed, and an acknowledgement that as long as it stands, Taiwan's "democratic firewall" will prevent outcomes desired by Beijing.

<sup>1</sup> Among other things, Hung advocated a firmer adherence to "One-China" than that which has characterized the KMT's long standing policy. Her proposal had little traction, even among traditional "blue" voters.

<sup>2</sup> "解放軍少將稱國民黨一些人赴陸騙吃騙喝 民進黨上台後問題更多", 香港01 (HK01), <https://www.hk01.com/中國/161444/解放軍少將稱國民黨一些人赴陸騙吃騙喝-民進黨上台後問題更多>.

## Principal Means

While disinformation, “fifty cents” harassment, and computational propaganda were utilized in the lead-up to the 2016 elections,<sup>3</sup> evidence of direct and sustained efforts by Beijing to directly meddle in elections in Taiwan with the aim of affecting their outcome only emerged in the context of the November 24, 2018, nationwide local elections in Taiwan. In October 2018, the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MJIB) confirmed that Beijing was interfering in the elections and revealed it was investigating 33 cases of suspected Chinese funding of various candidates.<sup>4</sup> Stating it had evidence the money is coming directly from the Chinese government — primarily the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office — the MJIB added that the funds were reportedly funneled to candidates favored by Beijing via Taiwanese business people with operations in China. Influential community members were also offered all-expenses-paid visits to China in return for assistance in helping select candidates win the elections. Two underground money exchanges, suspected of playing a role in the illegal money transfers to political campaigns, were raided by law enforcement officials. There is also reason to believe that crime syndicates, “dual use” Chinese firms with operations in Taiwan, as well as pro-Beijing political parties like the China Unification Promotion Party (CUPP, 中華統一促進黨) headed by Chang An-le (張安樂) and groups such as the Concentric Patriot Association of the ROC (CPAROC, 中華愛國同心會), both of which are fielding candidates in the elections, may also be involved in such activities.

Besides money, China also ramped up its psychological warfare, propaganda efforts, and disinformation campaign, using “content farms” (內容農場), “troll factories” (巨魔工廠), and various pages on social media platforms (PTT, Facebook, Youtube channels)<sup>5</sup> — some with suspected ties to the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF, 中國人民解放軍戰略支援部隊)<sup>6</sup> — to saturate the environment, support selected candidates, and sow confusion among Taiwanese voters ahead of the election.<sup>7</sup> Groups supporting KMT or independent candidates also amplified Chinese disinformation or generated their own. Additionally, poor editorial practices in Taiwan, characterized by lack of corroboration and high competitiveness in the news environment, further contributed to the dissemination of rumors and disinformation.<sup>8</sup>

By early November, Taiwanese authorities had identified four municipalities in which such efforts were particularly active. Candidates favored by Beijing, from the “blue” and “green” camps, as well as a number of independents, were known as “little brothers” (小老弟). The sobriquet was highly indicative of the nature of the relationship between Beijing and its subjects.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>3</sup> See Nicholas J. Monaco, “Computational Propaganda in Taiwan: Where Digital Democracy Meets Automated Autocracy,” Computational Propaganda Research Project, Working Paper No. 2017.2, <http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2017/06/Comprop-Taiwan-2.pdf>.

<sup>4</sup> “調查局長呂文忠：有中資金援特定候選人”，自由時報 (*Liberty Times*), October 22, 2018, <http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/1241193>.

<sup>5</sup> “國防部證實 中國成立網軍介入我選舉”，公視新聞 (*PTS News*), November 5, 2018, <https://news.pts.org.tw/article/412047>.

<sup>6</sup> Established in December 2015 as part of the PLA’s major reform to be in charge of cyber, electronic, information, and space operations.

<sup>7</sup> “中國「巨魔工廠」散布假新聞 國防部：第一時間會查明”，新頭殼 (*Newtalk*), November 5, 2018, <https://newtalk.tw/news/view/2018-11-05/162260>.

<sup>8</sup> See J. Michael Cole, “The Impact of China’s Disinformation Operations Against Taiwan,” *Prospect Foundation Newsletter*, [http://www.pf.org.tw/article-pfch-2049-6365?fbclid=IwAR3KBi6Jty6XSHt9n9gIFMvBj7uzE\\_kq0q90pGMOOn0RJYvBMEBoTlwcvxT8](http://www.pf.org.tw/article-pfch-2049-6365?fbclid=IwAR3KBi6Jty6XSHt9n9gIFMvBj7uzE_kq0q90pGMOOn0RJYvBMEBoTlwcvxT8).

<sup>9</sup> “中國利誘 把某些候選人當小弟”，自由時報 (*Liberty Times*), October 24, 2018, <http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/1241633>.

Taiwan's intelligence and law-enforcement authorities also warned that the political warfare aimed at the local elections were “trial runs” in preparation for the 2020 general elections, in which Beijing would seek to deny, as it has already threatened, re-election to President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) and instead help install a pro-Beijing candidate.<sup>10</sup>

## Principal Aims

Beijing's interference in Taiwan's electoral processes is driven by two directives. The first and more traditional one is to distort democratic processes through use of money, “fake news,” intimidation, and other means to advantage candidates who are either pro-Beijing or highly critical of the Tsai Administration. This approach is reminiscent of tactics used by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Eastern and Central Europe (e.g., Czechoslovakia) in the opening phase of the Cold War, where it used the veneer of democracy — and democracy itself — to install autocratic regimes that were subservient to Moscow.<sup>11</sup> If elected, those candidates will be expected to assist Beijing in bypassing central government institutions in Taiwan and perhaps to work toward unification alongside trusted United Front proxies such as the CUPP, the “Tainan Cross-Strait Exchange Promotion Association” (台南市兩岸交流協會), and the “Cross-Strait Taiwan Guangdong Exchange Association” (台粵交流協會).<sup>12</sup>

The second aim is more devious and just as harmful to Taiwan. Its effectiveness is contingent on how investigators and prosecutors handle this delicate situation. Both the pro-Beijing camp and a not-always entirely loyal opposition could use investigations targeting certain candidates — and their potential disqualification from the elections — as “proof” that the Tsai government is using state institutions to meddle with the elections. Through this, and with a sustained disinformation campaign, Beijing could attempt to cast doubt not only on the outcome of the elections, but, just as if not more damaging, the entire democratic process itself.<sup>13</sup> If the public loses faith in the mechanisms and legitimacy of elections, democracy can be in serious trouble. Much like propagandists who seek to engineer a world where the objective truth no longer exists and where every “fact” has become dubious or questionable, a campaign that successfully discredits electoral processes could sow enough doubt that the public comes to believe that all elections are a sham.

Underpinning much of Beijing's political warfare and propaganda efforts against Taiwan is the goal of undermining the effectiveness of, and belief in, Taiwan's democratic institutions. The “democratic firewall” itself is the problem, as it prevents the realization of outcomes that are sought by Beijing. Thus, even if Beijing's favored candidates did not win in the November elections or in 2020, China could still “win” by striking a blow against Taiwan's democracy, and hope to continue its erosion until such a time where democracy no longer stands in the way.

<sup>10</sup> Independent candidates are particularly attractive to Beijing, as they can largely operate outside the intra-party constraints and checks and balances that normally result from institutionalization and which prevent clean breaks with longstanding policy. Having lost hopes of finding partners within Taiwan's main political parties, the CCP may therefore place its bets on populist candidates who have no affiliations with those.

<sup>11</sup> See Robert Gellately, *Stalin's Curse: Battling for Communism in War and Cold War* (New York: Knopf, 2013).

<sup>12</sup> “白狼的統促黨比你想象的更接地氣！宮廟、農漁會、深綠鄉鎮都有它”，天下雜誌(*CommenWealth Magazine*), August 13, 2018, <https://www.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=5091632>.

<sup>13</sup> “中國干預年底選舉 透過兩大戰略打擊台灣民主制度”，信傳媒(*Cmmedia*), October 25, 2018, <https://www.cmmedia.com.tw/home/articles/12446?fbclid=IwAR0ggL6lod9QnEVIH08nquq3SczTiv2KHdhtVoWdLT5t43FiYQ7nF1aKNjc>.

# U.S.-Taiwan Cooperation to Counter PRC Interference and Disinformation

By Russell Hsiao

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The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) stresses strategic competition with revisionist authoritarian powers, namely Russia and China. According to the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford, China probably poses the greatest threat to the United States beyond 2025.<sup>1</sup> While Russia presents an immediate challenge, it is arguably a declining power. Whereas China's growing global influence and, with it, interference in the political process of other countries are becoming more aggressive and disruptive. Malign political interference not only affects the domestic political environment of those countries but also those countries' relations with third parties. Indeed, the NSS highlights how "[r]ival actors use propaganda and other means to try to discredit democracy. They advance anti-Western views and spread false information to create divisions among ourselves, our allies, and our partners."<sup>2</sup>

The heightened attention towards China's influence operations is occurring against the backdrop of the national security communities in many democracies growing concerns over China's "sharp power."<sup>3</sup> Among the tools in China's "sharp power" toolkit are information operations including propaganda and disinformation. As noted by the authors of the report: "[t]his authoritarian influence is not principally about attraction or even persuasion; instead, it centers on distraction and manipulation."<sup>4</sup> Taiwan is at the frontline of the PRC government's information campaign. There are many layers through which China's sharp power is "piercing, penetrating, or perforating the political and information environments."<sup>5</sup> They take many different forms and have been coupled with an increasing tide of fake news, misinformation, and even disinformation in Taiwan's information landscape.

The controversial pension reforms debate in Taiwan thrust the issue of fake news into the public square as Taiwan's netizens and users of a popular messaging app began receiving a flood of messages and were pushed

<sup>1</sup> "General Dunford: North Korea, Russia, and China Pose Greatest Threats to U.S.," *C-SPAN*, September 26, 2017, <https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4683544/general-dunford-north-korea-russia-china-pose-greatest-threats-us&start=22>.

<sup>2</sup> "The National Security Strategy of the United States," *The White House*, December 2017, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.

<sup>3</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., "How Sharp Power Threatens Soft Power: The Right and Wrong Ways to Respond to Authoritarian Influence," *Foreign Affairs*, January 24, 2018, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-01-24/how-sharp-power-threatens-soft-power>.

<sup>4</sup> Juan Pablo Cardenal et al., "Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence," *National Endowment for Democracy*, December 2017, <https://www.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Sharp-Power-Rising-Authoritarian-Influence-Full-Report.pdf>.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.



to websites carrying false claims about the central government's plans. Taiwan's national security authorities attributed the source of the fake news to a growing number of "content farms"<sup>6</sup> based in the PRC. The "poison" of disinformation could also have deadly consequences. Fake news that was circulated about a Taiwanese envoy's alleged failure to assist Taiwanese tourists stranded at a Japanese airport after a Typhoon struck in September led tragically to the diplomat committing suicide. The source of this fake news<sup>7</sup> was reportedly traced to an IP address in Beijing and attributed to a Chinese government task force. Other sources have been attributable and traced back to "content farms," social media accounts, and IP addresses based in China. Other measures include co-opting Taiwan's traditional media outlets. For instance, a media report supposedly citing information from the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MJIB) — which is equivalent to the American FBI — stated that media outlets and online public opinion companies in Taiwan have received "benefits"<sup>8</sup> from China and published polls and news content with favorable positions towards China.

Taiwan's diplomacy is also being complicated by Chinese disinformation.<sup>9</sup> A widespread but false media report that one of Taiwan's diplomatic ally was about to switch ties in May was traced back to a social media account based in the PRC's Hebei province. A real-time news clarification webpage<sup>10</sup> set up by the Taiwan government, which had to respond to 820 suspected fake news reports in 2018 alone, represented only the "tip of the iceberg" of the problem. As noted by Foreign Minister Joseph Wu, "with the advent of new technology, disinformation, and falsehoods are spreading faster than ever — in many cases faster than we can clarify."

That China is interfering in Taiwan's political process and attempting to undermine its democracy is not news. Yet, the Chinese Communist Party's political interference in other countries' elections was thrown into sharp international relief when President Donald Trump, at the UN Security Council meeting, accused China of interfering in the U.S. midterm elections. "Regrettably, we've found that China has been attempting to interfere in our upcoming 2018 election coming up in November against my administration," President Trump said on September 26.<sup>11</sup> "They do not want me—or us—to win because I am the first president ever to challenge China on trade," he added. The president later substantiated his claims by pointing to the Chinese state-sponsored *China Daily* inserts in Iowa's *Des Moines Register* that were railing against the Trump administration's trade policy.<sup>12</sup>

In the midst of the ongoing U.S.-China trade war, the United States and Taiwan signed an agreement for the latter to import soybeans<sup>13</sup> from the United States, then reports raising health concerns over GMO soybeans

<sup>6</sup> "國安單位：反年改陳抗 有中國勢力介入", 自由時報 (*Liberty Times*), July 18, 2018, <http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/1119633>.

<sup>7</sup> "Taiwan says China is waging a disinformation campaign," *Asia Times*, October 23, 2018, <http://www.atimes.com/article/taiwan-says-china-is-waging-a-disinformation-campaign/>.

<sup>8</sup> "中國干預台灣選舉 消息人士證實：2+1媒體收了好處", 自由時報 (*Liberty Times*), October 24, 2018, <http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/2590074>.

<sup>9</sup> "Remarks at GCTF Workshop: Defending Democracy through Media Literacy," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Republic of China, Taiwan)*, October 18, 2018, [https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News\\_Content.aspx?n=052449DD01A26E24&sms=DF52F83A5B7D2A47&cs=4FF0D5206CD87C03](https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=052449DD01A26E24&sms=DF52F83A5B7D2A47&cs=4FF0D5206CD87C03).

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Donnelle Eller, "Citing ad in Des Moines Register, Trump accuses China of meddling in U.S. elections," *Des Moines Register*, September 26, 2018, <https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/2018/09/26/donald-trump-des-moines-register-ad-attack-china-meddling-united-nations-president-election/1434194002/>.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Russell Hsiao, "Trump Administration's National Cyber Strategy Highlights International Cooperation," *Global Taiwan Brief* 3.19, October 3, 2018,



from the United States began circulating in Taiwan's social media.<sup>14</sup> While the claims about their adverse, if not catastrophic, health effects have been debunked by civil society and the government, it has not yet been determined whether the Chinese government was behind the disinformation campaign. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that CCP propaganda has also been directed against America's soybean farmers with the focus of weakening domestic support for Trump's trade policy.<sup>15</sup>

Highlighting the challenge, President Tsai Ing-wen underscored her government's determination to tackle the challenge of disinformation:

For cases involving systematic dissemination of disinformation from specific countries, we will strengthen cross-border collaboration. That includes not only experience sharing, but also setting up monitoring and notification mechanisms, so that together, we can respond to any damage or negative impact that disinformation has on social stability in various countries.<sup>16</sup>

Indeed, the United States and Taiwan are strengthening cooperation to combat fake news and disinformation. U.S. State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby participated in an international workshop held in Taipei co-organized by the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office under the auspices of the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF). In his keynote address, Secretary Busby noted:

Taiwan also knows all too well how a determined external actor with hostile intentions can place enormous strain on democratic institutions through various influence tactics, including disinformation. As our Vice President noted recently: "The Chinese Communist Party shapes the information environment by rewarding or coercing American businesses, movie studios, universities, think tanks, scholars, journalists, and local, state, and federal officials."<sup>17</sup>

The U.S. State Department's Global Engagement Center (GEC) is charged with leading the U.S. government's efforts to counter propaganda and disinformation from foreign actors. The mission of GEC, which was established in April 2016, is to "lead, synchronize, and coordinate efforts of the Federal Government to recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts aimed at undermining United States national security interests."<sup>18</sup>

To address the shared challenge of propaganda and disinformation, the United States and Taiwan should establish a mechanism that brings together technologists, academics, and civil society groups from both sides

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<http://globaltaiwan.org/2018/10/vol-3-issue-19/#RussellHsiao10032018>.

<sup>14</sup> "【假LINE】向美國進口16.5億美元基改大豆訊息影片？曲解謠言", *MyGoPen* | 這是假消息, October 1, 2018, <https://www.mygopen.com/2018/10/line165.html>.

<sup>15</sup> "China's propaganda machine takes aim at American soybean farmers," *CBS News*, October 20, 2018, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/chinas-propaganda-machine-takes-aim-at-american-soybean-farmers/>.

<sup>16</sup> "Full text of President Tsai Ing-wen's National Day address," *Focus Taiwan*, October 10, 2018, <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aip/201810100006.aspx>.

<sup>17</sup> "Remarks by Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby at the Opening of GCTF Workshop," *American Institute in Taiwan*, October 18, 2018, <https://www.ait.org.tw/remarks-by-deputy-assistant-secretary-scott-busby-at-the-opening-of-gctf-workshop/>.

<sup>18</sup> "Global Engagement Center," *U.S. Department of State*, <https://www.state.gov/r/gec/>.

on a regular basis to systematically share information and identify solutions to combat CCP propaganda and disinformation. A common operating picture is critical for enhancing transparency and promoting greater situational awareness. This may be facilitated by the creation and joint maintenance of a shared platform for rapid identification of propaganda and disinformation sources, adversaries' use of propaganda and disinformation technologies, a monitoring mechanism of the interaction of cyber operations and information operations for malign purposes, assessments of adversaries' responses to counter-foreign propaganda and disinformation, as well as technological and other policy solutions.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> "The Global Engagement Center's Technology Demonstration Series," *U.S. Department of State*, <https://www.state.gov/r/hec/tech/index.htm>.

# 請給事實大口呼吸的空間！

Tuesday, August 14, 2018

**Voicetank 思想坦克 | 胡元輝**

台灣民主走到今天，該高興、慶幸，更要奮鬥、前進。

為何值得高興、慶幸？因為它讓台灣人民可以當家做主，做自己想做的事，過自己想過的生活；為何還要奮鬥、前進？因為台灣民主有外部敵人，也有內部敵人，一不小心，就有倒退之虞，甚至有墜谷之憂。

外部敵人是誰？若要一一羅列，不勝枚舉，連缺乏企業倫理的跨國大公司都應包括在內。但根本不相信民主的中共政權，當然是最須提防的對象。隔海而來、蜂擁而至的假消息，就是北京政府威脅台灣民主的例證。

至於內部敵人，同樣輕忽不得。我們有高度競爭、畸形扭曲的媒體生態，貌似自由，卻多以爭取眼球為念；看似多元，卻陷入內容同質的泥淖，以致本應傳遞真實、揭露真相的媒體，淪為民眾眼中的亂源、公害。

政治生態亦然。解嚴迄今，不過三十餘年，民主制度雖已大致齊備，政治文化卻出現不進則退的弊象。癥結之一就在於政黨競爭屢屢淪為不擇手段的鬥爭，政治較勁往往變成零和遊戲的角力。

不僅政治生態糾結難解，民間社會同樣混沌不明。穩健的民主運作仰賴成熟的公民素養，公眾之間雖相互批判，仍彼此尊重；雖各有立場，仍尋求共識。一旦彼此詆毀，不問事實，不論是非，社會必然極化，民主必然危殆。

台灣民主得來不易，守護民主迫在眉睫，但民主的防衛之道在於自我鞏固，而非寄希望於外部敵人的鬆手。如何提升台灣的媒體生態、政治文化與公民素養？關鍵工程之一即在於讓「事實」有大口呼吸的空間，讓媒體競爭、政治較勁與公民對話都能從「事實」出發。



假新聞與假訊息之所以日益猖獗，原因不在傳播科技的日新月異，而在於理性認知的蒙昧，批判思考的失落，以致事實見不了光，出不了頭。圖片來源：Pixabay

媒體功能原在於提供公眾真實可靠的資訊，藉以實現人民自治；政治力量的攻防亦植基於公正資訊的提供與論辯，以期爭取民眾的認同；公民社會的存在更依賴公共領域的發達，藉以透過訊息交流及理性對話逐步凝聚公共意志。三個領域中的事實認定雖然是辯證的過程，卻絕非武斷與偏執心態的同義詞。

不幸的是，我們逐漸強大的內部敵人正是武斷與偏執心態的產物。假新聞與假訊息之所以日益猖獗，原因不在傳播科技的日新月異，不在數位工具的無遠弗屆，而在於理性認知的蒙昧，批判思考的失落，以致事實見不了光，出不了頭。各自以假稻草人相互攻擊，終至將對手視為不共戴天的寇讎。

因此，對台灣而言，意圖呈現真實新聞與資訊的事實查核（fact checking），不只是打擊假新聞的機制，更是一種認知能力的培養，思考模式的推動。希望藉此擴大「事實」的呼吸空間，讓整個社會逐漸避開簡單思考、快速求解的認知陷阱與思考惰性，逐漸遠離二元對立、同溫同感的發展泥淖與民主困境。

美國皮優研究中心（Pew Research Center）的調查發現，四分之一的美國人曾經分享過假新聞；認知科學家David Rand亦發現，平均而言，人們至少有五分之一的時間傾向於相信假新聞。此一現象何以形成？諸多研究證實，假新聞、假訊息的傳播實與人的腦袋有關，而不完全是人所使用的傳播工具。

當然，事實查核只不過是守護台灣民主的途徑之一而已，它能否有效抑制假新聞的傳播？能否真正提升台灣民眾的認知能力？都仍只是一種期待，亦受到諸多條件的限制，我們既不需要誇大它的效果，亦不應抱持虛幻的期待。但守護台灣民主需要的是行動，而不是口號。

全球許多民主國家都已出現事實查核計畫，而且數量正快速成長之中。由優質新聞發展協會與媒體觀察教育基金會共同成立的「台灣事實查核中心」，亦於七月底正式上線。此為我國第一個與國際規範接軌的事實查核機制，它的成果如何自然尚待檢驗，卻無疑是一項有心的實驗，更是一個認真的行動宣告。

事實查核在全球許多國家已經是一場運動。事實查核機制的研究者Lucas Graves認為，美國事實查核運動應該被視為一種新聞改革運動。作為一個台灣事實查核中心的參與者及事實查核運動的推動者，我有一個夢：希望事實查核在台灣不只是一個「打假機制」，更是一個鞏固民主的運動！

作者為中正大學傳播學系教授、台灣事實查核中心發起人





# 從中國操作「嚇實力」 看台灣對習政策的討論盲點

Monday, August 20, 2018

Voicetank 思想坦克 | 賴怡忠

小英總統訪問巴拉圭與貝里斯並過境美國，受到邦交國隆重接待，在蔡總統過境美國時媒體也全面開放採訪、與國會議員見面不用偷偷摸摸，能視訪台灣駐美單位，也訪問美國的聯邦機構，這都是過去少見之舉，顯見台美關係快速升溫一事絕非空穴來風。但小英在洛杉磯去85度C咖啡店喝咖啡，中國官方出面強硬抵制85度C。反而使得這杯咖啡成了蔡總統出訪的焦點。

不論對85度C的評價如何，這件事顯示中國運用國家力量介入社會與經濟事務，及其把議題政治化的能耐。有人說這叫做中國的「銳實力」（sharp power），但我看這更像中國的「嚇實力」（shock power），用政治與經濟手段搞恐嚇威脅以順遂己意之作為。從事後的反應來看，中國的咖啡嚇實力應該沒有成功。但中國很可能對這個教訓不以為意。

由於國台辦副主任，也是海協會常務副會長的龍明彪在85度C咖啡事件發生後出面表示，中國不歡迎海外企業一方面賺中國人的錢，但同時又支持台獨。龍的發言形同以官方身分對咖啡抵制事件背書。無獨有偶的，85度C咖啡在此事件後，其位於福建泉州的幾家分店也被官方調查。由於這些被指控的情事發生很久，但會在這個時候被調查，時間的巧合有很強的政治聯想。由於85度C咖啡在抗議後立即公開承認九二共識與兩岸一家親，還附和北京說法稱蔡總統為台灣地區領導人，但依然無法逆轉被官方調查，甚至在網路購物平台被下架的命運。

官方對某一產品抵制的背書不打緊，但當這是負責交流的海協會官員出聲支持，調查單位又是來自位於號稱習近平大本營的福建時，這個意涵就不普通。由於85度C是因為接待蔡總統喝咖啡而被官方支持抵制，可不可以說親習勢力，不管是來自習的授意或是下層官員揣摩上意，就是將蔡英文當成台獨分子而往死裡打呢？



中國運用國家力量介入社會與經濟事務，及其把議題政治化的能耐。有人說這叫做中國的「銳實力」（sharp power），但這更像中國的「嚇實力」（shock power），用政治與經濟手段搞恐嚇威脅以順遂己意之作為。圖片來源：達志影像／美聯社

## 不要懷疑，中國就是將台灣當成敵人

85度C事件似乎顯示，不管台灣蔡總統的作為如何，中國已經定調定性蔡總統為敵人，因此才會針對與蔡總統有接觸的廠家全面封殺，連賣杯咖啡給她都不允許，一旦發現有對蔡總統友善的企業，就要將其打趴到地上，也不管這些舉措在台灣人民眼中會造成何種惡感。與先前要求航空公司及國際飯店業需將台灣列為台灣、中國的行為相比，這個行動對蔡總統的針對性很高。

美方有學者曾提及在蔡總統當選後但尚未就任前，他當時與中國涉台官員談話所領受到的冷冽感。這位高階中方涉台官員對美國學者表示，收服台灣傾獨民心不一定要靠軟實力與柔聲說服，中國也可以強硬到使台灣人民害怕，只要其認知到歸順祖國是唯一的道路，這種方式同樣可使台灣刁民放棄獨立的想望。

習近平上台後就少提胡錦濤時代「寄希望於台灣人民」的主張，強調以我為主。但現在似乎也對國民黨放棄希望，官方有轉而支持柯文哲的跡象。但現在這種「以我為主」的做法有個特點，重點不是爭取台灣人民的認同，而更像是嚇阻台灣人民採取某種立場。由於信奉唯物論的中國共產黨一向認為下層建築支配上層建築，掌握經濟就可以牢牢掌握人民，之後只要再輔以強力威嚇就能達到效果。在這種思考下，類似85度C的「嚇實力」事件，即便對台灣人造成極大的反感與負評，相信日後還是會一再上演。

中國「嚇實力」實際上也對其他國家操作過。之前針對薩德反導系統在南韓部署，中國就抵制讓薩德陳列在其高爾夫球場的樂天集團，迫使樂天之後退出在中國的超市業務。85度C與樂天的經驗相比算是小巫見大巫。重要的是，中國當時也同樣不理會南韓人民的觀感。

## 幫中國壓迫開脫的想法正在侵蝕台灣的戰略主動權

針對現在的兩岸關係，台灣一直有個聲音認為中國官方還沒對蔡英文點名批判，官方也還沒直接說蔡就是台獨，因此對方並未關掉溝通的大門。有人進一步說雖然門看起來已經關上，但是還沒上鎖，所以兩岸復動還是有機會的。這些人還主張因為習近平需要處理的問題很多，其反貪打腐導致樹敵無數，各種內政議題都是個麻煩，因此沒有升高台灣議題在政治決策位階的誘因，因為這會迫使習要直接處理這個麻煩的問題。先前舉行過連習會的習近平發言，這個分析認為其證明了習無意升高台灣問題。

持這些觀點者中更有人進一步主張，既然中國沒關上門，台灣就應避免會產生讓中國認為台灣無意溝通，或是對中態勢強硬的舉措，以免被習近平政敵操作捧殺習迫使習需對台灣出手。為了避免讓中國認為台灣在反中，這些人主張無論是台美合作，台日關係的促進、或是新南向政策等，都要考慮到中國的情緒，因此在某些領域的國際合作就該審慎，這些人也希望蔡政府要多提兩岸可以合作的議程，以營造台灣願意維持兩岸和緩的氣氛。

針對美方決策人士一再提醒台灣不要小看習近平統一台灣，包括武統台灣的決心，這些人反而一再強調習近平是理性自持，在試圖降溫台灣議題。台海事態嚴重化是習的周邊幕僚揣摩上意，或是習近平的政敵有意升高衝突的結果。中國戰機繞台已經夠糟，但這些人強調中國戰機還



沒跨越台灣的防空識別區。中國斷絕台灣邦交已經夠壞，這些人認為中國可以一次斷光台灣所有邦交但卻沒這麼做。中國做的每一件事，這些聲音會強調中國沒有讓情況更壞，因此認為蔡政府應該把握每個機會釋出善意。對這些人來說，中國的壓迫永遠不夠硬，台灣的善意永遠不夠多。

馬政府「兩岸高於外交」強調台灣必須先處理好兩岸關係後，才能真正發展外交關係。拒絕承認台海對峙的結構性因素，把兩岸敵對關係當成短期現象，才會引導出台灣要「先兩岸、後國際」的怪異思考。這使得台灣雙手奉上外交主動權給中國，一切以不違逆中國的玻璃心為主要考量。前述有關幫中國的對台壓迫開脫，將兩岸關係和緩的責任放在台灣的主張，與馬政府「兩岸高於外交」的思考在政策效果上是一樣的。

這種思考的共同問題，是不將習近平現在所做的事作為分析原點，反而把猜測習近平在何種執政處境會作出何種選擇，當成分析的主軸。不根據事實及其產生的效果，而是根據對習近平執政風格的臆測，根據這種分析方法所提出的建議，自然是十分危險。

### 美國國安戰略報告認為中國在改變現狀，台灣反認為習近平會維持現狀？

從中國對台灣動用「嚇實力」，以軍事作為進行威脅恫嚇，拔除台灣邦交國，封殺接待總統的企業等，這些作為都與胡錦濤時代的舉止差很大。國內一堆言必稱重視兩岸關係者，只會跟著中國官媒對台灣說三道四，卻無視於習近平本身種種改變台海與亞太現狀的作為。

去年十二月推出的美國國安戰略，已經認定中國的作為在挑戰並改變台海與印太區域的現狀，但國內卻有一堆人強調習近平是「被迫改變現狀」，因為習須面對中國難解的內政及黨內對手問題，暗示習近平無意改變包括台海在內的現狀，因此關鍵在於要兩岸相互體諒，不讓習難處理／難做人。這導致對中國對外作為的分析，變成如何理解與包容習大大決策困境的分析。在這個邏輯下，自然會以管理兩岸關係的角度看中國對台的「嚇實力」作為，而不會將其視為是中國整體對外「嚇實力」在台灣議題的表現。

如果連對中國正在改變台海與印太現狀，北京將台北視為敵人等這些基本認識都被當成佛地魔而不可說，台美要形成戰略共識會很困難，更甬提在印太戰略的合作了。

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## 近期兩岸關係的總評估

Wednesday, September 19, 2018

Voicettank 思想坦克 | 董立文

總體來說，目前兩岸關係已經進入「冷對抗」的時刻，這是指在低度自我克制下的相互對抗，意即對抗而不到全面破裂，而這種對抗會表現在兩岸政治、外交、經濟、社會與軍事等各個層面。造成這種局面的原因是結構使然，意即影響兩岸關係的四大因素相互交織的結果，包括：一、國際因素（美中台三方關係）；二、台灣與中國的內部發展（政治、經濟與社會）；三、兩岸互動（官方政策與民間交流）與台灣與中國的文化歷史價值觀（認同與民族主義），這四者相互作用的產物。

其實，兩年來似乎當兩岸領導人的政策講話帶有和緩意味，營造善意的氣氛之際，就有意外事件產生，而讓兩岸關係重回相互敵對的惡意螺旋中。最近，當「連習會」中總書記習近平的講話頗有善意，而主委陳明通在美國也遞出橄欖枝之際，接連發生浙江軍事演習、東亞青運被停辦、國際航空公司台灣被改名事件，兩岸關係重回震盪緊張。

習近平的講話，被國台辦主任劉結一給予強硬的解釋，前社科院台研所周志懷則給予溫和的解釋，顯示中共內部對台政策有不同的主張。事實上，2018年以來，中共對台負責人汪洋與劉結一等人，在談論對台政策時都有點名指責民進黨當局，但是習近平的講話沒有點名民進黨政府與蔡英文總統，保留了迴旋的餘地，但後果還是一樣。

中共對台政策最大的問題在於反台獨變成反台灣，在國際社會上羞辱打擊台灣，搞成「兩岸一家仇」。依照這種「一中原則」市場化與國際化的邏輯，還有千百個行業要去執行，舉例而言，下一步是不是要發函給全世界所有地圖的製造商，要求把地圖上的台灣改為中國？否則就是「一中一台」的體現？難道中國真的要用政治力量去干預全世界的經濟、市場與商業行為，它的代價會是什麼？



中共對台政策最大的問題在於反台獨變成反台灣，在國際社會上羞辱打擊台灣，搞成「兩岸一家仇」。圖片來源：達志影像／路透社

另一方面，除了對外打壓之外，對內拉攏也是重點，未來必定是中共對台31項措施的成果驗收期，像是8月28日國台辦公布「各地各部門持續加緊推動落實31條措施」以及9月12日宣布申請居住證的台灣人已有一萬二千人等，反正國台辦一定會大加宣傳績效。

中共各地方相繼公布「具體惠台措施」，普遍無差別的對台灣的學生與年輕人提供多種不同的優惠政策與現金福利，問題是，這些優惠與福利並沒有提供給中國自己的外地省市特別是偏遠窮困地區的年輕人，這就把台灣年輕人塑造為一特權階級，這種政策歧視自己的年輕人，不但荒謬也不利於兩岸健康與正常的交流。

針對中共大量堆疊「優惠政策、便利措施」，來形塑中共政權對台灣人民的友好親善形象；並輔之以若干真人真事案例來宣傳中國大陸的「商機無限、機會大好」的社會氛圍。我方必須打破不講問題、不看風險的中國市場大好迷思，而且要從政府自己做起，政府單位要「做研究、追真相、講實話」。我政府應該改變過去談兩岸交流時「講成績」的態度，改成「不避諱講問題」的態度。針鋒相對，破除中共的對台工作不實宣傳，以實例對實例。針對過去受害案例結合民間團體提出「反中共誘騙迫害台灣人」與「對台31措施，受害台商要先賠」的訴求，應要求中共的「惠台措施」必須優先賠償這些受害者。

在反統戰的部分，應以美國為師，前段時間美國聯邦參議員盧比歐致函華府智庫威爾遜中心，要求說明將參加研討會的中國學者王輝耀的政治背景。盧比歐質疑王輝耀具有中共統戰部官員身分。在新聞曝光後，王輝耀已經不在網站的與會嘉賓名單之列。盧比歐在信函中表示，中國國家主席兼中共總書記習近平將統戰工作與其政治影響力視為黨的「魔法武器」（magic weapons）之一，隨著中國政府在全世界展示銳實力，中國統戰部門需要更嚴密審查。事實上，我國立法委員也可以比照辦理。

最後，假如美、中關係制約著兩岸關係，那麼，美、中貿易戰就是總體結構的關鍵因素。進一步而言，假如美、中關係的穩定才有兩岸關係的穩定，那麼，美、中貿易戰的結果無疑的會預示兩岸關係未來的走向，現在我們只能做好準備，拭目以待。

作者為台灣智庫諮詢委員





# 迎戰假新聞不能畏首畏尾

Wednesday, September 26, 2018

Voicetank 思想坦克 | 馮賢賢

最近民進黨立委葉宜津提《國安法》第二條修法，將網路領域列為國安範疇，被統媒及國民黨批為「箝制言論自由」。台灣從解嚴至今，人民已視言論自由為理所當然。過去為爭取言論自由長期與國民黨抗爭的民進黨，對於被指控「箝制言論自由」可能會特別緊張，這不是壞事，畢竟捍衛言論自由是核心民主價值。但在網路已成言論傳播主要管道而未受合理規範的今日，不能因為被不在乎國家安全的一方亂扣帽子就退縮。重要的是，如何妥善維護言論自由，同時確保國家安全。因此，該修的法，絕不是《國安法》一條而已。



在網路已成言論傳播主要管道而未受合理規範的今日，不能因為被不在乎國家安全的一方亂扣帽子就退縮。重要的是，如何妥善維護言論自由，同時確保國家安全。  
圖片來源：Pixabay

近兩年來，網路傳播的假新聞威力越來越大，造成社會動盪、左右大選結果的案例不斷增加。2016美國總統大選受到倫敦一家政治顧問公司隔海操控、五千萬筆臉書用戶個資被挪用傳播假新聞就是經典案例。此事在今年被媒體揭發，成為震撼全球的大新聞。英國脫歐公投也曾遭到假新聞操弄。許多國家都開始以立法及其他行動來遏止假新聞對公共利益的危害。而針對網路訊息傳播的立法，是全新的領域，各國都在摸索中。台灣有許多其他國家的案例可以參考，審慎評估後就該趕快行動，不必怕東怕西。網路變化快，立法不能太慢。若未來發現立法有未盡完善之處，還可以再修法，其他國家也是如此。

為避免限縮言論自由，如何定義「假新聞」及該負責任者，以劃定合理打擊範圍，是必須要先做的功課。嘲諷性的言論不是假新聞，例如政治漫畫、政治嘲諷秀，都屬於言論自由的正當行使。「假新聞」是刻意製造的不實訊息，以達到不正當的目的。假新聞英文通俗的說法是fake news，也有人稱misinformation。但更正確的用法應該是disinformation，因為misinformation是錯誤訊息，disinformation則是故意製造的假消息。重點是故意，內容有真有假，但關鍵部分為假。例如關西機場旅客受困的假新聞，事件背景是真的，受困旅客被巴士載運去安全地區也是真的，但誰派的巴士？卻由此掰出一大堆假消息。

「假新聞」需要查證，但查核事實不是政府該做的事，只能由民間來做。政府該做的，是必

須快速回應與政府業務有關的假新聞，而媒體也有責任查核訊息的真實性。最近台灣民間團體成立了一個小小的「台灣事實查核中心」，針對關西機場事件進行了詳細的事實查核。即便真相已明，假新聞卻造成一位外交官折損無可回復的悲劇。散佈假新聞的多家媒體，卻連一聲抱歉都不說，堪稱台灣奇觀。

打擊假新聞，必須針對製造的源頭，以及傳播渠道，而非末端的接收轉傳者，這是立法時需要斟酌的分寸。今年六月，有民進黨立委提案修《社會秩序維護法》，針對轉傳假新聞者施以刑罰，是搞錯了立法方向。台灣許多假新聞源頭來自中國，雖然無法可管，但臉書等網路經營者是可以立法規範的。臉書老闆祖克伯也在2016年承認，臉書是媒體。各國針對媒體的行為，都有立法規範。我們現在該做的，是重新定義網路業者。他們早已不只是「平台」，而是實質的媒體經營者，有內容、有傳播、有廣告。2016年，台灣媒體廣告分布，網路首次超過傳統媒體，即證明網路業者已是影響力最大的主流媒體。

在美國總統大選被假新聞操控的醜聞爆發後，臉書的祖克伯被迫出席美國國會聽證。這也顯示，網路不再是化外之地。二十年前的立法思維，是網路必須完全自由，除了金錢詐騙及兒童色情之外，網路不可管；但網路近年來爆炸性的發展，使得上述思維成為過去式。網路業者開始推出標示、檢舉等機制來保護消費者，但由業者自律力道不夠，民間的事實查核中心能量不足，還是需要有一套完整的立法架構，來保障公民不受假新聞欺騙以及選舉不被謊言及外國勢力操控。

因此，將網路領域納入國安範疇，只是修法的一環。同樣重要的，是我們必須重新訂立符合現在媒體情境的媒體法律，將網路業者所經營的新興媒體納入法律規範。以法國為例，在選舉前五個月內，政府可封鎖社群媒體散佈的假新聞，甚至封鎖傳播假新聞的網站。另外臉書、推特、YouTube等社群媒體，必須公布付費內容及競選廣告的買主與金額；選舉當事人可針對假新聞提告，要求簡易裁判以制止假新聞傳播。法國議會特別在今年七月修法，將「假新聞」定義為「被操縱的消息」，以保護嘲諷性的言論表達。

台灣現有的媒體法律是早已過時的廣電三法，紙媒則完全不受約束。但紙媒也是媒體，且早已網路化，也該納入規範。民進黨版的反媒體壟斷法已將紙媒納入反壟斷的規範，沒有理由在維護公共利益與國家安全的迫切需要下，讓紙媒逍遙法外。

NCC不該只管傳統的廣電媒體，而無法針對包含臉書、谷歌、Line等網路媒體進行合理規範。因此，NCC組織法、廣電三法都該修法。NCC必須認清，「網路不可管」的理念已經不合時宜，且傳統廣電媒體已喪失主流地位，網路媒體才是新主流。新的媒體立法必須納入所有的媒體，並以NCC為主管機關。有新的正確認知，才能在新的媒體局勢中制訂出與時俱進的法律規範以保障公共利益。至於查核事實這種媒體該做的的基本動作，我們只好期待比較完備的媒體立法出現後，不自愛的諸多媒體們會尋求改進以因應新局勢吧。

| 作者為文化工作者





# 假新聞，真實暴露了台灣的脆弱

Friday, September 28, 2018

Voicettank 思想坦克 | 羅慧雯

筆者日前受邀參加一場在台北舉辦的國際學術研討會，主題是「對話與蛻化」，受邀發表的場次則是關於科技如何賦權（empowerment）社會運動的主題。這是個學術界長久的命題，似乎也有些學界的共識。筆者從網路科技與社群媒體如何促成太陽花學運的成功談起，並在結論中提醒，科技的賦權作用並非都是正面，要看它的賦權給了誰。

過去學者分析網路在社會運動中的意涵時，通常聚焦於兩個重點，一是認為網路超越空間與時間的限制，幫助人們串連並採取集體行動。另一個重點則是認為網路科技打破傳統媒體的壟斷，使人們透過網路取得未經編輯的即時資訊進而掌握到真相，採取行動。

然而，回顧這十年來的網路發展，其對社會的意涵正歷經巨變。從阿拉伯世界反對獨裁政權的茉莉花革命、到訴求經濟平等的佔領華爾街運動、台灣的太陽花運動，都是社群媒體展現力量促成改變的經典。社群媒體建立在既有的人際網路基礎之上，更能凝聚共識、傳佈知識、與促成集體行動。也就是這種激發社運與反抗運動的潛力讓極權政府非常警覺，所以中共當局從茉莉花革命開始就持續加強對維權人士、網路言論的監控。

太陽花學運興起於2014年，可算是社群媒體推動社運的一波高峰，也使人對「以網路強化及鞏固民主」這樣的理想有了極大的期待。諷刺的是，從2016年開始，以假新聞透過臉書影響美國總統選舉作為開端，社群媒體這項傳播科技工具已經不再是鞏固民主的利器，反倒成為民主政治運作上逐漸擴大的裂縫。

換言之，俄羅斯和中國這些威權或極權政府也開始受到網路科技工具的賦權，發起了對民主體制的內部攻擊，利用民主政治內部的黨派對立，以假新聞提供源源不絕的子彈，讓其相互廝殺。最近就有報導明確指出俄羅斯在美國社群媒體上製造假新聞時，乃是分別從自由派、保守派陣營，散佈假訊息讓其相互攻擊，其目的在製造衝突、分裂美國社會。



太陽花學運興起於2014年，可算是社群媒體推動社運的一波高峰，也使人對「以網路強化及鞏固民主」這樣的理想有了極大的期待。圖片來源：達志影像／美聯社



因此當前真實且迫切的問題是，民主的自我防衛機制是什麼？在科技工具的威脅下，如何發展更新的自我防衛可能性？台灣近來頻頻出現的假新聞事件，也必須放在這個脈絡下理解。

說到民主的自我防衛機制，近期最熱門的話題就是彰化二水的五星旗寺廟。該寺廟作為中共在台基地之一，已經是存在多年的事實，近期在選舉壓力下才終於拆除，但拆除理由是因為違建。不免讓人推想，如果那寺廟建物不是違建，是否可以繼續每天升五星旗，大聲播放〈義勇軍進行曲〉，並掛上共產黨基地的招牌？以中共的組織策略，它很可能在全台灣每個縣市都收買一群人，建立同樣的據點，而我們的政府卻認為這是個人信仰與意見表達自由？中國的政府發言人已經公開將此次拆除違建定調為政治迫害，其實就是要為將來的其他據點在創造條件。也就是只要願意幫中共政權在台工作，就會被中共視為自己人，至少在口頭上會幫你討公道。從這件事情的處理（就連違建都放任多年不敢處理，並別說在合法建物中的活動），可知道台灣缺乏民主自我防衛的機制與社會自覺。



彰化二水的五星旗寺廟，近期在選舉壓力下才終於拆除，但拆除理由是因為違建。如果寺廟建物不是違建，是否就可以繼續每天升五星旗，大聲播放〈義勇軍進行曲〉？圖片來源：Youtube華視新聞

民主如何自我防衛的問題就如同數學上的「黎曼猜想」證明題般，對世界各國來說都還是個無解的問題。另一方面，魏明仁的違建不敢拆，縱容愛國同心會打人……，則是凸顯在中共的威脅下，我們連執法標準都放棄了。然而，更根本的問題是，那些極力反對政府處理假新聞者，有多少人是想搭著假新聞打擊政府威信的便車來獲得自己的選舉利益？這豈不是以政黨利益優先國家利益的表現嗎？又有多少人是因為中國崛起使他抱著亟欲表態效忠的心理？或者是身家財產早已押寶在中國市場上？面對假新聞對民主的傷害，台灣和歐美國家相較，就多了這一層特殊的糾葛。

對台灣而言，假新聞的傷害絕不僅是言論自由與公共利益的平衡問題，也不僅是民主政治受到極權政體操縱及如何自我防衛的問題，更是攸關敵我意識混淆的國家安全問題。若不從這樣的脈絡來理解假新聞為何對台灣傷害如此之大，則解決之路遙遙無期。

作者國中時綽號為費雯，大學念台大經濟系，研究所念新聞，於日本京都大學取得經濟學博士學位，曾任公共電視研究員，現在在傳播學院教書。關注各國影視產業發展，也喜愛追劇以及考察各種庶民史，相信數位時代中仍存在著具支配力的媒體，因此需要公民持續監督。



# 當民主腳下湧入紅色暗流

**Sunday, November 11, 2018**

Voicettank 思想坦克 | 趙君朔

過去一個月來，在關心政治的族群當中自不待言，連一些平時較少出現政治議題的女性臉友版面上都開始有關於高雄市長選情的貼文，而且幾乎都是關於目前聲勢看漲的國民黨候選人韓國瑜。韓成功創造出一些熱議的話題固然是主因，但韓在某些傳統媒體與社交網站上不成比例的曝光度也讓人好奇，為何一個八月還在媒體專訪中說自己連一碗滷肉飯都沒有的候選人，卻忽然人氣高漲，在各類媒體上鋪天蓋地出現，大有在民進黨長期執政的高雄翻盤之勢。

如果韓暴起的原因是個人條件優異，配上對的選戰策略而危脅到一直被認為是穩操勝券的民進黨候選人陳其邁，那這正是民主政治之福，透過良性競爭來增進人民福祉，沒有什麼好擔心的。然而韓國瑜本身過去的經歷到現在的經歷其實頗受爭議，目前提出的具體政見也透露出對高雄的缺乏了解和可行性。



但他所提出的一些口號和因此創造出來的正面新聞效益卻不停在新舊媒上被放大而拉動了他的人氣和支持度，這讓人開始擔心在美國2016總統大選、法國2017總統大選時外來網路力量試圖干預大選的幽靈是否重現在台灣上空，因此本文會透過簡短回顧一些民主政體運作遭到挑戰的討論與美國在2016年大選的慘痛經驗，來看這次很可能一樣有外力介入的選舉干預是否會成功，並且跳出本次選舉這個單一案例，來思考要如何長期因應中共持續以網路攻勢培養親共社群的挑戰。

研究當前民主政體危機的新秀政治學博士、哈佛大學講師Yascha Mounk在他的新書《The People vs. Democracy》中，將民主政治受到威脅歸咎於三個互相關連的原因：1. 社交媒體的興起 2. 經濟的停滯 3. 身份認同。相信對台灣地方政治有所了解的人看到這三點應該都會想歎口氣，因為很不幸的在六都中，高雄是最符合後面兩個條件的（處於痛苦的經濟轉型中又有在比例上僅次於台北市的外省籍貫人口，而其中又有不少是軍人背景），現在又配上社交媒體的推波助瀾與韓本人炒作議題的能力，無怪乎在短時間內韓的聲勢就急起直追。



韓國瑜提出的一些口號和因此創造出來的正面新聞效益不停在新舊媒上被放大而拉動了他的人氣和支持度，這讓人開始擔心在美國**2016** 總統大選、法國**2017**總統大選時外來網路力量試圖干預大選的幽靈是否重現在台灣上空。圖片來源：達志影像／美聯社





雖然說韓打出來的各項議題在經過仔細檢視後大部分都經不太起考驗，但韓的人氣卻完全不受影響，之所以會如此，則很可能和網路時代形成的封閉且極化政治社群現象有關係。首先觀察到這個問題的是三位哈佛的學者，他們在《Network Propaganda》一書中強調了在一些非常右派的新聞媒體如Breitbart News和Fox News上，常有非常極端、甚至根本是假造的新聞來美化意識形態相近的政治人物，或是醜化對立陣營的人物。這些媒體已經放棄了傳統上媒體所要求的專業標準比方說客觀查證、正反意見並陳等，造成的主要後果便是看這些媒體的選民的偏見會不斷強化，再透過在社交媒體上同溫層的互相取暖形成一個封閉的團體，無法隨著新資訊的出現去修正原來的偏見和認知誤區。

這也就是為什麼以川普為首的不少民粹政治狂人如菲律賓總統杜特爾特等的支持度不會因為他們屢屢失當的言行而大幅下滑，有時候還會反過來讓核心鐵粉更堅定的支持。在台灣我們一樣可以看到某些媒體對政治新聞的解讀高度偏袒藍營或是綠營，但目前比較起來，在藍營這一邊這種封閉迴圈不斷自我強化的傾向更明顯，除了前面提到的網路時代的扭曲新媒體生態外，另一個造成這個現象的因素也和美國類似，是面對大環境的危機感。

在Mounk的書中，他強調在2016年投票支持川普的選民本身很多經濟狀況很不錯，不是刻板印象認為的大部分是失業工人。但他們會被川普宣稱要帶來改變的政見打動，是因為他們也看到自己周遭有很多人的處境一直在惡化，進而衍生出危機感，並期待一個強有力的領導人帶領人民走出困境。類似的狀況在高雄一樣看的到，特別是政治立場傾向藍營的選民更會對藍營勢力的不斷下滑與看到對岸的經濟實力增強感到憂心，這就是為什麼韓國瑜的一句高雄又老又窮激起了廣大迴響。

然而最令人擔心的還不是上述的種種現象，而是如果在選情已經焦灼的緊繃狀態下，有神秘的力量繼續放出錯誤或是蓄意的假新聞，再透過機器人帳號廣泛的在各大政治社群中傳播，那麼已經存在的政治對立、分裂也會進一步放大，再被擅長煽動的民粹性政治人物利用、炒作後，原來看起來是不可思議的大逆轉翻盤就不是遙不可及了。

一旦選舉的結果並非選民經過深思熟慮後投下的一票所決定，而是被偏頗、錯誤的訊息所操弄，那民主政治的意義可以說是蕩然無存。很不幸的，這也是中南海希望看到的結果，因為在資訊充分流通的公平競爭選舉下，當前台灣的主流民意會選出對中共有所防範的領導人，而不是嚮往對岸表面光鮮但實際上藏污納垢的權貴資本主義與缺乏人權、自由的惡性獨裁。而這樣的尷尬狀況如果持續，對中共鋪天蓋地的民族主義宣傳會是極大的反諷。

是故，中共一直想到影響台灣每次總統大選的結果。但如果回顧一下中共之前面對台灣重要選舉的作為，會發現在本次終於得到一些比較正面的效果之前，中共的成績只能說是灰頭土臉。在1996的飛彈試射、2000年朱鎔基聲色俱厲的記者會都只帶來反效果。在社交媒體興起並成為政治傳播的主要管道前，中共在2004、2008是被迫選擇了裝聾作啞。更能凸顯中共的國力並不強而一直都是世界趨勢跟隨者的，就是2014的台北市長大選，面對和自己關係如膠似漆的連戰公子要競逐大位，中共儘管在控制、操弄牆內網上輿論是舉世無雙，卻對素人柯文哲充滿創意的網路選戰一籌莫展，完全幫不上忙。要到看到俄羅斯在2016、2017年在網路上積極介入美歐大選，中共才如大夢初醒般想如法炮製在本次的台灣選舉中，也終於形成了一定的影響，並讓高雄市長的選情成為台灣近來最熱門的話題。那麼，究竟這次的大舉操作和之後一定會源源不斷的類似舉動，會達到中南海想要的效果嗎？

按照目前英文主流媒體對於社交媒體讓政治社群兩極化的反思，在網路刻意放出來影響政治風向的消息要不是幽默取向就是要能激起憤慨，如此便能在網路上更廣的傳開來。對岸目前因為電商的發達，據估計網路公司共僱用了兩百萬左右的職業網路風向員。這些人目前的作用在於網路的商業行銷，但這種專業要改應用在政治上並沒有太大的門檻，因此只要對岸的宣傳部門和對台事務部門真的想，僱用大量網軍在台灣網路製造輿論攻勢是輕而易舉的。

但幸好，也由於對岸自己在牆內對於政治討論的嚴格監控與壓制，他們對於台灣的政治甚至一般民情只有片面的了解。因此，如果是由對岸土生的網軍來選擇主攻議題和製作內容，吸引力和挑起憤怒的效果會極其有限，甚至和20年前的文攻武嚇一樣，只會有反效果。但如果對岸是只出錢，在台灣找本地的合作夥伴，精選本地的議題來攪亂政治討論的生態，那後果便令人擔憂。而眼下韓國瑜在高雄掀起的熱潮，似乎便是台商砸了大錢給台灣本地的網路行銷公司創造出來的成果。

照目前的情勢看來，韓即使沒有翻盤，也可望在選舉中交出不錯的成績單，可以想見食髓知味的中共勢必想在之後故伎重施。為了要防止台灣步上其他民主政體被民粹吞噬，甚至是更慘，被中共隔海遙控的窘境。政府實在有必要快速進行網路政策的改革，這方面倒是被對岸走在了前頭。蔡總統應該仿效習近平成立並親任組長的中央網路安全和信息化領導小組，設立類似機構，納入各權責相關機構如國家通訊傳播委員會、國安局、國安會、新成立不久的資通電軍等，來統一制定應對中共進行網路政治操弄的政策手段，比方說，在中小學開始實施識別網路假資訊的教育。

另外也應該利用目前台美關係轉好的時機，請求美國政府協調讓台灣的相關機構能拿到臉書、推特、YouTube等社交網站和中共設立的可疑帳號活動資訊來加以研究、分析，建立有關中共網路戰的大數據資料庫。最後也應開展對某些被中共利用當出錢白手套台商的情蒐，讓更多的類似勾結能盡早曝光。

在中共的軟實力仍不成氣候前，這是台灣能有效加以反制的最後黃金時期，不然在兩岸語言相通、來往持續密切、中共相對資源龐大的情況下，恐怕中共會有機會不用到一兵一卒，在虛擬空間便讓台灣好不容易得來的民主陷無窮盡的對立、混亂之中。

作者有個雲霄飛車式的人生，曾很輕鬆的進了不太好進的美國學校博士班，以為自己會是華文社會科學界的明日之星，又因為一個烏龍，更「輕鬆」的被踢出來，開始闖盪亞洲江湖，到處求人下單，到目前為止的心得是「我32歲以前到底活了什麼？」





# 抵抗中國「銳實力」， 台美應倡議「人類安全」

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中國「銳實力」(sharp power)帶給世界的最大潛在威脅在於：讓民主弱化與衰微，並使威權強化及擴張。在談因應之道之前，必須對其權力運作有所了解。

從權力運作的手段來看，銳實力所憑藉者並非「軟實力」(soft power)所訴諸的吸引和說服，而是「硬實力」(hard power)所仰賴的強制與誘因，例如資訊扭曲、假消息散布，或以各種經濟誘因／威脅製造自我審查(self-censorship)、塑造公共輿論，凡此皆涉及對個人自由的壓迫。從權力運作的目的來看，中國對海外民主社會行使銳實力，是為了破壞人們對民主的信任，進而建構民眾對威權有效性或正當性的認同。

其具體效果是：中國威權體制本身因對外樹立各種「防火牆」、保持封閉而免於外來文化影響，但民主社會卻因對外開放而易受中國資本與資訊的滲透，此種封閉體系與開放體系之間的不對稱交流，造就了中國威權主義在當代國際社會中的外溢效果(spillover effect)。

不論從權力運作的手段或目的來看，中國銳實力都涉及個人或群體能否自由選擇其生活方式，亦關乎基本人權與民主原則是否受到侵犯，故不只是傳統意義上個別國家所關切的「國家安全」(national security)問題，同時也是全人類必須共同面對的「人類安全」(human security)問題。

面對中國銳實力的擴張，美國作為自由世界的領航者，台灣作為美中「新冷戰」的前哨站，恰可聯手應對中國威權主義的外部影響，以維護共同的價值與利益。具體來說，基本的因應之道在於對與中國之間的資本及資訊的輸入與輸出做出適當的審視與管理，以求突破甚至扭轉現狀之下威權體系與自由體系之間不對稱的交流結構。



中國「銳實力」(sharp power)帶給世界的最大潛在威脅在於：讓民主弱化與衰微，並使威權強化及擴張。圖為從媒體中心看習近平在第一屆中國國際進口博覽會致詞。圖片來源：達志影像／路透社。



對內而言，台美應保護並強化自身的民主體制，使其免於中國銳實力的過度衝擊。首先，在資本輸入方面，台美應謹慎審查中國相關投資或併購案之中有傷害基本人權、言論／新聞自由之虞者。例如北京2009年起推出「大外宣政策」，資助國有媒體向海外擴張、鼓勵中資購買或持股當地媒體、大規模投資好萊塢電影，試圖過濾禁忌話題、壓制批評聲音、提升中國形象。

然而美國目前對外資的審查，多出於在經濟與安全上能否維持相對優勢的「國家安全」考量，主要聚焦在涉及關鍵技術的高科技產業。但在中國銳實力影響下，在政治上能否保有自由民主生活方式的「人類安全」考量也不容忽視，在此思維下，諸如媒體、網路、出版、文化等涉及資訊公共性與觀點多元性的產業，也應考慮納入外資審查時的敏感部門。台灣目前未開放中資投資相關產業，但鑑於北京可能透過台商或外資購買台灣媒體，當局對相關投資的審查亦應謹慎。

其次，在資訊輸入方面，台美應致力於把外來訊息的來源端透明化、將傳播端納入管理、並對接收端「賦能」（empower）。北京經常透過付費置入內容、直接提供內容等方式遂行其對外宣傳。前者如國台辦及省市府對《中時》與《聯合》提供置入性行銷、中共黨報《中國日報》對《華爾街日報》與《華盛頓郵報》贊助副刊專欄、「中美交流基金會」對美國智庫及學界提供補助，後者則如中國官媒向海外電台提供免費外語內容、北京被指透過網路散布假消息以影響台美選舉。

為了避免民眾受表面訊息的蒙蔽與誤導，台美當局不僅應依法要求訊息傳播者揭露資訊來源及背後的贊助者，也應考慮修法要求包括社群網站在內的傳播媒體承擔起事實查核責任並輔以適度的罰則。更重要的是，為了確保民眾享有充分資訊以參與民主，政府除了鼓勵民眾媒體識讀與民間事實查核之外，也應考慮強化公廣集團、並建立讓民間媒體追求自主與多元的誘因機制，目標是確保公民社會在被外來信息戰包圍之際仍有替代性的資訊來源。

另一方面，台美對外宜協同理念一致的國際盟友，要求北京鬆綁其威權統治，以促進中國的自由化、民主化。首先，在資本輸出方面，國際社會應適度管制對中國的技術出口，以免特定有助威權統治的先進技術持續流入中國。例如中共興建「天網」用以監控內部社會，其所需的核心理技術與晶片多仰賴包括美國在內的西方國家供應，目前荷蘭政府已取消相關技術的出口許可。

除此之外，國際社會也應要求北京取消或降低威權管制，以協助跨國資本順利進入中國市場。目前美國對中國的貿易訴求多涉及兩國貿易不平衡、中國補貼國內企業、強迫技術轉讓、侵犯智財權等經濟與安全上的考量。然而中國當局也經常以市場准入作為誘餌或威脅，要求包括Google在內的跨國企業配合從事媒體內容審查與民眾個資控管，相關當事國或可參考Google當年退出中國市場所發聲明，考慮將該等威權管制視為貿易障礙，經由WTO對北京共同施壓要求鬆綁。



中國威權體制本身因對外樹立各種「防火牆」、保持封閉而免於外來文化影響，圖為2010年退出中國前的Google北京總部。圖片來源：達志影像／路透社。

其次，在資訊輸出方面，國際社會應在促進中國政府鬆綁威權、開放市場的同時，為中國社會注入更多未經「防火牆」過濾、更完整、且更多元的資訊。長久以來，中國政府對外來的書報、網站、乃至影視作品皆採取嚴格的管制及內容檢查，使得置身封閉體系的中國民眾難以完整接收來自開放體系的訊息和觀點，以致其自由選擇生活方式的能力受到壓抑。一旦北京的政經管制進一步鬆動，將使自由體系的資訊更容易進入中國社會，有助於中國民眾取得更充分的資訊來決定自己渴望的生活方式，亦有助於自由與威權的價值在中國內部乃至國際體系展開對等交流與公平競爭，理應有助於中國走向自由化與民主化。

綜合而言，台美面對中國銳實力，或可聯合國際盟友，基於「人類安全」原則畫下一道紅線，並據此就與中國之間的資本與資訊交流進行適當的審視與管理，以求對內守護並強化民主體制，使其免於中國威權滲透，對外則尋求反制並弱化中國威權體制，爭取中國人民及世人對自由民主的嚮往和尊重。

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